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Literary Property and Copyright 
By Alina Ng* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Copyright laws emerged out of necessity when the earliest printing presses were 
introduced into the book trade.  After the Statute of Anne codified an assortment of 
censorship, licensing, and trade-control rules to produce the world’s first copyright 
statute in 1710,
1
 it soon became clear in the United Kingdom and in the United States that 
all rights in creative works were provided by statute.
2
  Copyright laws have steadily 
expanded since the Statute of Anne to protect owners of creative works.  In the past 
decade, attacks on these expansions by left-leaning critics have become visceral and 
intense.  As copyright owners assert absolute property rights over creative works and 
critics argue that state interests operate to balance and limit statutory rights, perhaps the 
terms of this debate might be clarified through a determination of whether copyrighted 
material is property in a legal sense.  If copyright is indeed property in a de jure sense, is 
it the same thing as “literary property”?  If so, then copyright law provides copyright 
owners with the absolute right to own and control literary works in the same way that a 
natural property right provides real property owners with the perpetual, exclusive, and 
absolute right to own and control property to the exclusion of all others.  The purpose of 
this Article is to explore the notion of literary property, to determine whether literary 
property may be equated with copyright, and, if so, to assess what the implications might 
be for modern copyright law as it adapts to newly emerging technological, social, and 
cultural trends. 
¶2  In Part II, this Article examines the notion of literary property as a distinct legal 
concept, which protects an author’s natural right in a manuscript because of the innate 
connection between a creator and his work.  This discussion shows that literary property 
safeguards an author’s creative interests and expectations against the rest of society, 
including printers and publishers who purchased the right to print the manuscript.  Part III 
considers whether literary property can be equated to the modern property right that 
statutory copyright creates.  Part III concludes that literary property and copyright are 
distinct legal concepts, and proposes that the two different bases for recognizing 
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 For excellent studies on the history of the copyright system, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 
(1993). See also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1–37 (1966) (presenting a 
concise account of the first 350 years of copyright law). 
2
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834); Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 
(H.L.) (Gr. Brit.). 
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ownership of creative works—natural property and economic incentives—should be 
explicitly recognized as separate and distinct ideas to ensure clarity in policy that 
determines legal entitlements to creative works.  Part IV evaluates how such a separation 
of natural property and economic incentives affects and shapes the debate of the elusive 
balance between private rights and the public interest.  Part IV surmises that a separation 
of rights from incentives and the acknowledgement of specific norms recognizing 
authors’ entitlements and obligations will allow the copyright system to realize its 
constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.
3
 
II. LITERARY PROPERTY AS A LEGAL CONCEPT 
¶3  The full extent to which literary property can be said to safeguard an author’s 
natural right over his own work may be a matter of pure academic speculation.
4
  What 
appears certain, however, is that literary property predates statutory copyright and 
protects an author’s personal interest and individuality to a greater extent than an 
industry-based entitlement intended to control the mass production and publication of the 
work.  Authors produced literature before the invention of the printing press made 
copying cheap and easy, and, while plagiarists were often severely admonished for 
representing someone else’s work as their own,
5
 pirates, who reproduced works in their 
totality, were often praised for preserving the integrity of the original work.
6
  Thus, even 
before copyright existed to protect commercial rights to print, publish, and distribute, 
noneconomic incentives motivated authors to express themselves through poetry, songs, 
and literature, expecting the community to respect the personal integrity of authors.  
Conceivably, the author’s expectation that society will respect personal rights that protect 
the author’s creative integrity exists independently of any printing privileges or rights to 
print manuscripts that the state awards to some publishers and authors to encourage 
development of a printing industry and capitalistic trade in literary and artistic works.
7
  
Before Gutenberg introduced the printing press, printing privileges and monopolies were 
not needed to encourage the development of a publishing industry; nor were printing 
licenses required to control the types of works.
8
  It would have been clear without the 
intense competition that moveable-type print technology introduced into the market for 
 
3
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
4
 There does not appear to be evidence of actual protection of literary property, but the term has often 
been used interchangeably with copyright to signify some proprietary or ownership right to the work.  Mark 
Rose, for example, refers to the early copyright struggle between booksellers in England as “the question of 
literary property.” See ROSE, supra note 1, at 4.  Lyman Ray Patterson and Stanley Lindberg, on the other 
hand, suggest that literary property and copyright are essentially different things. See L. RAY PATTERSON & 
STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 122 (1991).  To them, the 
rights of authors should not be treated as copyright but as a “companion body of law.” See id. 
5
 AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 9 (1899) 
(“You may search through the huge compilations of Justinian without lighting upon a word indicative of 
any right possessed by the author of a book to control the multiplication of copies; and yet books abounded 
even before the invention of printing, and though the pirate escaped animadversion, not so the plagiarist.”). 
6
 MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 34 (2010). 
7
 JANE A. BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE AND MUSIC IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 10 (2001) 
(describing the emerging printing industry in Venice when the Venetian Senate granted the first printing 
monopoly to Johannes de Spira). 
8
 For a discussion of state control of publishing activities to prevent sedition and heresy, see ROSE, supra 
note 1, at 31–32. 




 that, as a matter of natural law, the sole possessor of any rights to a 
manuscript, poem, or song would be its author.  Literary property seemed to protect the 
author’s expression at natural law, while statutory rights to print and publish manuscripts 
provide an economic incentive to invest in the printing industry.  These separate rights 
that emerge from entirely different sources, as evidenced by the relationship between 
authors and publishers that developed when printing and publishing became a robust and 
profitable trade in Europe and the United States, had served separate and distinct interests 
in creative works. 
A. Author’s Expectations and Publishing Norms 
¶4  Although the notion of literary property has not been well defined in literature and 
very little has been written specifically about literary property in the context of authors’ 
creative rights in their works,
10
 it appears to be another source of rights and obligations 
for the author.  From historical evidence on author–publisher relationships in the 
developing book trade in late seventeenth century England, scholars have deduced that 
literary property, as the right of the author, was a larger right that encompassed the 
publisher’s copyright.  The earliest preserved contractual agreement that transferred a 
right to print from the author to his publisher was John Milton’s publication contract with 
Samuel Simmons for Paradise Lost in April of 1667.
11
  For the manuscript of Paradise 
Lost, Milton received five pounds upon signing the contract and an additional five pounds 
after each edition of the manuscript was sold.
12
  The contract provided for the publication 
of three editions of the manuscript of 1,300 copies each.
13
  Both Milton and Simmons 
agreed that these three editions would not run more than 1,500 copies each.
14
  Scholars of 
eighteenth century English literature consider the payment of twenty pounds to have been 
an extremely modest payment for the manuscript of an epic poem at that time, but 
evidence of the amount typically paid for the sale of a manuscript when Simmons 
purchased Paradise Lost is too scant to conclusively determine that Milton was underpaid 
for the poem.
15
  Generally, a publisher’s unfair treatment of an author might indicate a 
superior position in the author–publisher relationship that would have allowed the 
 
9
 For a description on the impact of moveable-type printing presses on the literary market, see PAUL 
STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 26 (2004) 
(describing how a capitalistic market for the book trade developed as Gutenberg’s print technology spread). 
10
 The notions of literary property and authorship have been examined in relation to the 
commodification of literature, and some scholars of law and literary studies have attributed the emergence 
of literary property and authorship to the commodification of literature with the development of the book 
market in the eighteenth century. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 1, at 1–2; MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE 
AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 22–33 (1994); Peter Jaszi, On 
the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293 
(1992). 
11
 Peter Lindenbaum, Authors and Publishers in the Late Seventeenth Century: New Evidence on Their 
Relations, 17 LIBRARY 250 (1995). 
12
 Peter Lindenbaum, Milton’s Contract, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439, 441 (1992). 
13




 There is some evidence that Milton’s contemporaries were paid much more for their work.  Richard 
Baxter, for example, received a total of £170 over a thirteen- to sixteen-year period for his Saint’s 
Everlasting Rest.  He received £10 for the first publication of the manuscript.  There is also evidence, albeit 
unreliable, that John Dryden received £20 for the manuscript of Troilus and Cressida in 1679. Id. at 442–
43. 
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publisher to control all of the rights to print and sell manuscripts.  But this did not appear 
to be the case with Milton’s contract.  On the contrary, Milton appeared to have superior 
bargaining power in this arrangement, as the contract contained provisions that protected 
Milton as an owner of specific property rights in the manuscript even after the right to 
print the work had been assigned to Simmons. 
¶5  Perhaps the most telling sign that Milton retained some form of literary property in 
Paradise Lost after assigning the right to print to Simmons was that one of the clauses in 
Milton’s contract allowed him to “demand an accounting of sales at reasonable 
intervals.”
16
  Should Simmons have failed to provide such accounting after Milton 
demanded one, Simmons would have been required to pay him the five pounds for the 
whole impression immediately, rather than after completing the sale of 1,300 copies.
17
  
This clause indicates that both Milton and Simmons thought the author possessed some 
form of property right in the work even after the right to print it had been assigned.  
Because only a co-owner of a property interest or a beneficiary in a trust relationship 
could demand an accounting of sales,
18
 it appears that both Milton and Simmons 
considered the author of a manuscript to be its owner while the printer is put in the 
position of a trustee for as long as the printer owned the limited right to print the work. 
¶6  Professor Peter Lindenbaum furthermore points to the provision capping the 
number of copies Simmons could print to suggest that Milton possessed some form of 
property right in the work.
19
  The provision capped the number of prints to 1,500 and 
ensured that the printer’s profits would not disproportionately exceed the author’s.
20
  This 
further supports the claim that the printer’s right to reproduce the work was limited when 
compared to the author’s more encompassing property right.  Studying the same contract, 
Lyman Ray Patterson observes that Milton agreed to refrain from interfering with 
publication of the work, which Professor Patterson argues would be unnecessary if 
assigning rights to the printer conveyed all existing legal rights in the work.
21
 
¶7  Milton’s publication contract for Paradise Lost provides rare and invaluable 
evidence of literary property as an author’s right, acknowledged by both authors and 
publishers, even before authors were recognized as capable of owning copyrights in their 
work.  Before the Statute of Anne was passed in 1710,
22
 copyright, as the right to print, 
publish, and vend literary works, could be owned only by printers and publishers who 
were members of the Stationers’ Company, the trade guild regulating the book publishing 
 
16




 Magruder v. Drury & Maddox, 235 U.S. 106 (1914); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1984). 
19




 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 74.  Patterson also examined two conveyances by the poet James 
Thomson. Id. at 74–75.  The first was from Thomson to Millar, a publisher, which contained the specific 
assignment of the right to print with the benefit of all additions, corrections, and amendments that Thomson 
might make to the work after the assignment of the copyright. Id. at 74.  The second conveyance from 
Millan, a bookseller, to Millar granted the right to lawfully claim all profits from the printing and 
publishing of the poems. Id. at 75.  Patterson highlights that both conveyances emphasized the transfer of 
different rights. Id.  Thomson transferred the copyright together with what Patterson called “the author’s 
creative rights”—the control over the work to make additions, corrections, and amendments 
notwithstanding the ownership of copyright. Id.  The emphasis on profits arising from the printing and 
publishing of the poems in the second conveyance suggests that copyright was of a more limited nature 
than the author’s right. Id. 
22
 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 




  Ownership of copyright in a book was recorded in the register book of the 
Stationers’ Company by the stationer licensed by the Crown to print the book.
24
  Authors, 
who only rarely owned a copyright in their work that was entered into the company’s 
register, were generally excluded from owning the right to print and publish their work.  
Yet Milton’s publication contract suggests that authors had a more complex relationship 
with their publishers than is commonly assumed, even before authors were recognized as 
legitimate copyright holders by the Statute of Anne.  One could deduce from Milton’s 
contract that the author possessed creative and proprietary rights in the work as its 
creator—rights that provided the author with ownership and control over the work even 
after he sold it to the printer.  These rights were separate and distinct from the publisher’s 
copyright and were viewed as more limited rights to print and recover profits from sales 
of the work. 
¶8  Milton’s contract is not the only historical evidence that suggests authors had a 
more encompassing right in their work than modern copyright provides.  The publication 
contracts between early American authors and their publishers after the passing of the 
first U.S. copyright statute of 1790
25
 also allude to an author’s continued proprietary and 
creative control over their work, even after the sale of the manuscript and assignment to 
the publisher.
26
  For instance, the March 1868 publication contract between Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Ticknor & Fields (which later became Houghton Mifflin Company) for the 
publication of May-Day and Other Pieces contained a clause that granted Ticknor & 
Fields “the sole right to publish” the work for the duration of the agreement, which 
appears to have been carved out of Emerson’s larger proprietary interest
27
 and to provide 
a written order for the printing of any additional editions that Ticknor & Fields 
considered expedient.
28
  Emerson had the option to terminate the contract at any time, 
 
23
 Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522, 526–28 (2000). 
24
 Early copyright was intertwined with Crown censorship policies as the government sought to control 
the publication and distribution of what were considered heretical and seditious materials.  The Stationers’ 
Company was the perfect body, and copyright the perfect instrument, to implement these policies through 
an intricate system of licensing laws. See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 114–42. 
25
 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
26
 Publication contracts that predate the 1790 Copyright Act would be ideal to show that authors clearly 
had rights that were separate from the rights of publishers.  There is, however, a paucity of contracts that 
showed a clear distinction between author and publisher, in part because of certain personalities of well-
known authors writing at that time.  Benjamin Franklin, for example, was a well-known author who wrote 
before the first U.S. Copyright Act was passed.  He was also a publisher, and printed and distributed his 
own work.  Hence, there was no need to address the separate rights of publisher and author.  Thomas Paine 
was also famous for his revolutionary work, Common Sense, but published it anonymously because of its 
treasonous content.  As such, there is no suggestion of the author’s separate claim to the contents of the 
manuscript. 
27
 Contract for publication of May Day and Other Pieces between Ralph Waldo Emerson and Ticknor & 
Fields cl. 2 (Mar. 4, 1868) (on file with Houghton Library, Harvard University); see also Contract for 
publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, New Edition with Illustrations, a Bibliography and an Introductory 
Account of the Work between Harriet Beecher Stowe and Houghton, Osgood & Co. cl. 6 (Nov. 21, 1878) 
(on file with Houghton Library, Harvard University). 
28
 Clause 4 of the contract reads: 
The said party of the first part [Emerson] shall deposit with such printers as the parties 
hereto shall mutually agree upon, the stereotype plates of the said work, and whenever 
the said parties of the second part [Ticknor & Fields] think it expedient to print an edition 
of the said work, the said party of the first part shall give a written order for printing the 
required number of copies, and no copies shall be printed from the plates of said work 
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which would require that he purchase all remaining copies in Ticknor & Fields’s 
possession at cost.
29
  It is notable that even given the Supreme Court’s 1834 decision of 
Wheaton v. Peters, which held that authors do not have a common law property right 
separate from the statutory right to print and publish,
30
 Emerson’s contract protected the 
author’s right to control the contents of his manuscript from any alteration or 
modification by requiring the author to provide stereotype plates of the work and 
authorization for the publication of any new editions.  This right appears to be 
independent of statutory copyright.  The termination clause of the contract further 
affirms, implicitly, the author’s proprietary right in his creative expression by protecting a 
claim to restitution of the published work that should belong only to a property owner.
31
  
It would have made more business sense for Ticknor & Fields to require Emerson to 
purchase the remaining stock at market price upon termination of the publication contract 
and seek contractual damages for reliance loss.
32
  However, this was not the agreement 
between author and publisher in this case.  By providing Emerson with the option to 
terminate the contract at any time with only the penalty of purchasing the remaining stock 
at cost, Ticknor & Fields appeared to recognize Emerson’s property right in the work 
itself—a larger proprietary right that included the more limited statutory right to print that 




without such written order. 
Contract for publication of May Day and Other Pieces, supra note 27, cl. 4. 
29
 Clause 6 of the contract reads: 
The party of the first part can at any time terminate this agreement by giving to the 
parties of the second part written notice of his intention so to do; and in the event of his 
terminating this agreement, he shall purchase at its cost all the stock of the said work the 
parties of the second part shall have on hand, paying therefor in cash. 
Id. cl. 6. 
30
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
31
 See, e.g., GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 11 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing 
that restitutionary claims vindicate property rights of its claimant, with which the defendant had interfered); 
Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages from Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory, 1 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 115, 129–30 (2000) (arguing that the notion of property rights is a highly 
contested concept that is open to competing interpretations, and hence, cannot be used as a basis to justify 
claims of restitution); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 
1279 (1989) (defining restitution as (1) a recovery based on unjust enrichment and (2) a restoration in kind 
of a specific property).  In Emerson’s case, the fact that the publisher would return printed copies of the 
book to Emerson at cost price, even when Emerson terminated the agreement, suggests that the publisher 
saw restitution as a way to restore Emerson’s property right in his expression contained in the work. 
32
 See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 
52, 54 (1936) (The law “may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the harm which his 
reliance on the defendant’s promise has caused him.  [The] object is to put him in as good a position as he 
was in before the promise was made.  The interest protected in this case may be called the reliance 
interest.”). 
33
 The publication contracts between Houghton Mifflin and other authors such as Harriet Beecher 
Stowe, Henry David Thoreau, and Oliver Wendell Holmes show the same implicit recognition of an 
author’s property rights in his work by the publisher in the reversion or destruction of stereotype plates 
after termination of contract and in the promise to publish the work in ways that will affirm the author’s 
creative personality.  The publication contract for Harriet Beecher Stowe’s new edition of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin reads: 
If, at the expiration of five years from date of publication, or at any time thereafter, the 
demand for said work should not be sufficient in the opinion of the parties of the second 
Vol. 10:7] Alina Ng 
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¶9  As a legal concept, the term literary property often connotes an individual right that 
grants exclusive ownership of a work.  Copyright cases suggest that there are three 
distinct but interrelated characteristics of literary property, each of which will be 
discussed below:  literary property (1) conveys a proprietary right, (2) protects a creative 
interest, and (3) arises from an author’s natural right.  Literary property grants the author 
proprietary rights in the work by recognizing the author’s expectation to maintain control 
of the work even when it is subject to the Copyright Act.  In 1985, for example, the 
Supreme Court held that an author has the right to control the first public appearance of 
unpublished expressions and that society’s expectation to have access to the work was 
secondary to the right of the author.
34
  Because the Copyright Act of 1976 protects works 
as soon as they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
35
 the Court’s decision to 
deny the defense of fair use once the work has been fixed but remains unpublished 
protects the author’s right to decide whether to publish a work as well as when, where, 
and in what form.  These common law rights fall outside the explicit rights in the 
Copyright Act.
36
  The right to confidentiality, privacy,
37
 and creative control of the work 
is a proprietary right that protects expression of the author’s personality and individuality.  
 
part [Houghton, Osgood & Co.] to render its publication profitable, then this agreement 
shall end, and the party of the first part [Stowe] shall have the right at his option, to take 
from the parties of the second part, at cost, the stereotype or electrotype plates (and 
engravings if any) of said work and whatever copies they may then have on hand; or, 
should he fail to take said plates and copies at cost, then the parties of the second part 
shall have the right to dispose of the copies on hand as they may see fit, free of copyright, 
and to destroy the plates . . . . 
Contract for publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, supra note 27, cl. 7.  In the contracts for the publication 
of Henry David Thoreau’s works entered between his younger sister, Sophia Thoreau, and Ticknor & 
Fields was a clause that ensured the publishers printed and published the work “in good style.” Contract for 
publication of Excursions between Sophia E. Thoreau and Ticknor & Fields (Sept. 1, 1863) (on file with 
Houghton Library, Harvard University); Contract for publication of Letters of Henry D. Thoreau between 
Sophia E. Thoreau and Ticknor & Fields cl. 3 (Mar. 20, 1865) (on file with Houghton Library, Harvard 
University); Contract for publication of The Maine Woods between Sophia E. Thoreau and Ticknor & 
Fields cl. 3 (May 2, 1864) (on file with Houghton Library, Harvard University); Contract for publication of 
A Yankee in Canada with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers cl. 3 (Sept. 3, 1866) (on file with Houghton 
Library, Harvard University).  The contracts for the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s works have a 
similar clause that the publisher print and publish the work “in good style.” Contract for publication of The 
Autocrat of the Breakfast Table between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ticknor & Fields cl. 3 (May 13, 
1867) (on file with Houghton Library, Harvard University); Contract for publication of The Guardian 
Angel between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ticknor & Fields cl. 4 (Nov. 26, 1866) (on file with Houghton 
Library, Harvard University); Contract for publication of Mechanism of Thought and Morals between 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Fields, Osgood & Co. cl. 3 (Dec. 7, 1870) (on file with Houghton Library, 
Harvard University); Contract for publication of Poems by Oliver Wendell Holmes between Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and Ticknor & Fields cl. 3 (May 13, 1867) (on file with Houghton Library, Harvard University). 
34
 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
35
 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
36
 The specific rights that the Copyright Act recognizes are the rights to reproduction, distribution, 
derivatives, and public performance and display. Id. § 106. 
37
 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198–99 (1890) 
(“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.  Under our system of government, he 
can never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness-stand); and even if he has chosen to 
give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given 
them.  The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression adopted.  It is 
immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in painting, by sculpture, or in music.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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In essence, it is a personal right even if it is commercially valuable to the author and 
publisher.
38
  More importantly, the Court’s explicit protection of the creative space 
necessary for an author to develop her ideas during the prepublication stage and polish 
her work for public dissemination acknowledges the author’s personal interest in how the 
work projects the author’s personality and individuality to the reading public.
39
  
Furthermore, the doctrine arising from a famous case between J.D. Salinger and Random 
House protects an author’s right to control the use of unpublished letters that have been 
made publicly available through library archives on the same principle that “[t]he 
copyright owner owns the literary property rights, including the right to complain of 
infringing copying” of the letters’ expression.
40
 
¶10  While literary property protects the proprietary interest of authors, the right is more 
limited in scope in that it appears to protect only the authors’ creative interests in their 
work.  Generally, the commercial interests of authors are protected through statutory 
copyright law,
41
 but, at least in the United States, the creative rights of authors do not 
receive the same degree of protection through the copyright statute.
42
  The notion of 
literary property, because of its genesis in the author’s natural right as the creator of the 
work, protects creative rights:  the author’s personal rights to protect his personality, as 
expressed in the work, from distortion by others in society.
43
  This right serves the 
important function of ensuring that the author of a work can preserve the integrity of that 
work once it is made publicly available because the work represents the author’s 
personality and makes a unique contribution to society through the author’s authentic 
expression.  Given the important contribution that the author’s expression makes to 
society, Professor Patterson argues it is in society’s interest to reciprocate by protecting 
the author’s creative interest in that work.
44
  Authors generally expect two things from 
making their creative pursuits available to society:  (1) payment for their work and (2) 
 
38
 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (“The right of first publication implicates a threshold decision by 
the author whether and in what form to release his work.  First publication is inherently different from other 
§ 106 rights in that only one person can be the first publisher; . . . the commercial value of the right lies 
primarily in exclusivity.”). 
39
 Id. at 555 (“The period encompassing the work’s initiation, its preparation, and its grooming for 
public dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor.  The Copyright Act, which accords the 
copyright owner the ‘right to control the first public distribution’ of his work echos [sic] the common law’s 
concern that the author or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical stage.  The obvious benefit 
to author and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop their ideas free from fear of 
expropriation outweighs any short-term ‘news value’ to be gained from premature publication of the 
author’s expression.”) (citations omitted). 
40
 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987). 
41
 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
42
 The creative rights of authors of works of visual art also receive some degree of protection under 
§ 106A. See id. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (protecting authors from plagiarism by providing the right “to claim 
authorship of that work,” also known as the right of attribution); id. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (protecting the right of 
integrity by providing the right to prevent the use of the author’s name for work that the author did not 
create); id. § 106A(a)(2) (protecting against misrepresentation by providing the right to prevent use of 
“name as the author of a work in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work 
which would be prejudicial to [the author’s] honor or reputation”); id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (protecting authors 
from intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work); id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (protecting 
against any destruction of work of recognized stature).  This provision has very strict boundaries and is 
limited in its application.  What amounts to a “work of visual art” is defined narrowly under the Copyright 
Act. See id. § 101. 
43
 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1213 (1998). 
44
 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
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preservation of their creative personality and the integrity of their work (although authors 
may be motivated to create for other reasons such as fame, notoriety, or to inspire social 
and political reform).  As the Copyright Act facilitates the work’s commodification to 
garner rewards from the market, the noneconomic interests of authors can be protected by 
an explicit recognition of literary (or creative) property through common law. 
¶11  Literary property rights also arise from authors’ natural rights in their work and are 
attributed to the relationship between an author and his work.  The idea that authors own 
property in their work because that work embodies their personal individuality predates 
the earliest copyright statute
45
 and was acknowledged not because of an existing social 
convention but as a fundamental human right of individuals to own that which they create 
through their labor.
46
  In protesting censorship of literary work, John Milton proclaimed 
that books “contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose 
progeny they are” as well as “preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of 
that living intellect that bred them,”
47
 revealing the author’s understanding of his work as 
an extension of his personality or individuality—as a part of him.  Even if the process of 
literary creation inevitably builds upon existing works, the very act of mixing personal 
expression with literary resources and ideas from the commons (or nature) creates an 
author’s literary property right in the work that justifies authorial control over how the 
work is used, particularly when the public use of the work goes against the author’s 
intention for creating that work in the first place.  Therefore, literary property is a right 
that protects authors’ expectations separately from those of publishers, is proprietary in 
nature, is limited to the protection of creative rights, and exists because of the natural 
connection between an author and his work. 
B. Literary Property as a Natural Right 
¶12  Modern copyright law, which protects the economic rights of copyright owners, 
whether author or publisher, is statutorily created.  The legislature, courts, and scholars 
have long recognized the economic role that statutory copyright plays in encouraging and 
rewarding creative production for public benefit.
48
  The genesis of literary property 
 
45
 The Statute of Anne 1710 was the first copyright statute to be passed in England and explicitly 
recognized the right of authors to print, reprint, and publish literary works. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 
Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
46
 The most familiar idea that supports the author’s natural right in the work is probably John Locke’s 
passage in his Second Treatise on Civil Government that every man has property in his person, and when he 
removes something out of nature to mix it with his own labor, he has property in it. JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690) (“Though the earth and all 
inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a ‘property’ in his own ‘person.’  This nobody 
has any right to but himself.  The ‘labour’ of his body, and the ‘work’ of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his.  Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state of that Nature hath provided and left in it, he 
hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”). 
47
 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of 
England (1644), reprinted in PARADISE LOST: AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT, SOURCES AND BACKGROUNDS, 
CRITICISM 339, 342 (Gordon Teskey ed., 2005). 
48
 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“[C]opyright law ultimately serves the purpose of 
enriching the general public through access to creative works . . . .”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation 
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts.”); see also Steven Hetcher, Desire Without Hierarchy: The Behavioral Economics of Copyright 
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rights, which protect less tangible interests of a human creator such as personality and 
identity, may be less certain.  Statutory copyright developed as socio-economic 
conditions evolved to create a demand for creative materials, which legal protection of 
authors’ and publishers’ economic rights aim to meet.
49
  This idea that printed materials 
are receptacles containing an author’s intellect and creative personality draws a clear 
distinction between, on one hand, an author’s expectation to have control of the 
manuscript itself through some form of literary property (which protects the manuscript 
in its entirety), and, on the other hand, an economic interest in publishing and selling the 
work as one right from a bundle of rights (which stems from the author’s proprietary 
interest or ownership of the manuscript).
50
 
¶13  Several normative narratives have been advanced to support the acknowledgement 
of literary property as a natural right of the author.  John Locke’s labor theory has often 
been cited as support for the normative proposition that authors ought to have property 
rights in the products of their creative labor.
51
  Instrumental within this line of thinking is 
Locke’s notion that individuals have property rights in and ownership of their person, and 
hence the labor of one’s body and the work of one’s hand—when mixed with commonly 
available resources from nature—should produce a thing that may be appropriated out of 
nature and be protected as a proper subject matter of a property right.
52
  Another 
normative narrative supporting the author’s property right in a work is Wilhelm Hegel’s 
writings about property as an important attribute of freedom and thus necessary for the 
development of the author as a social being, whose dignity and value as an individual 
thrive on the ability to control resources from one’s external environment.
53
  Hegel’s 
 
Incentives, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 817, 819 (2010) (describing legal scholars’ reliance on the incentive 
theory as the primary motivation for creativity); Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: 
Rhetoric, Reality, and Restriction on Academic Freedom, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 544 (1999) 
(“Given the Framers’ predilection for open inquiry and the high value they placed on innovation in ideas 
and technology, it makes sense that the Framers’ focus in enacting the Copyright Clause was encouraging 
maximum production and dissemination of new works.”). 
49
 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 18–21 (describing how the commercialization of music printing in 
sixteenth century Venice led music composers and publishers to seek printing privileges (an early form of 
copyright) to commercialize their work and distribute it to the public); see also WOODMANSEE, supra note 
10, at 52–53 (describing how legal recognition of proprietary ownership of authors and publishers in the 
work through legislation facilitated its distribution). 
50
 Scholars have noted this important distinction between ownership of the manuscript and ownership of 
a right to print and sell the manuscript. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29 (1987) (“The author, as creator of the new work, clearly had the right to ‘judge 
when to publish, or whether he will ever publish,’ and nothing in the statute inhibited this right.  The 
bookseller, however, could own the copyright only by reason of assignment.  Ownership by reason of 
creation and ownership by way of assignment, of course, are subtantially [sic] different.  Natural-law 
arguments support the former, but not the latter.”). 
51
 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297 (1988); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539; Weinreb, supra note 43, at 1222–23; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural 
Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 523 (1990). 
52
 LOCKE, supra note 46, at 20. 
53
 See Hughes, supra note 51, at 330; Christian G. Stallberg, Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying 
Copyright: An Universalistic–Transcendental Approach, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
333, 348 (2008); David Dante Troutt, I Own Therefore I Am: Copyright, Personality, and Soul Music in the 
Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 373, 389 (2010).  For a more general 
application of this idea to property law, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982). 




 to a very large extent, forms the foundation for the protection of 
certain inalienable moral rights owned only by the creator of a work in author’s rights-
centric jurisdictions, such as France and Germany.  These rights, such as the rights of 
attribution, integrity, disclosure, and withdrawal, protect the creator’s individuality or 
personality which, subsumed by the work, should not be separated from the author as a 
person and sold to another.  In these jurisdictions, economic rights are completely 
alienable from the creator of the work while moral or “personality-based” rights
55
 (rights 
that protect the personality and integrity of the author) remain attached to the creator and 
can never be sold.
56





 moral rights are not generally recognized in the United 
States.
59
  Of course, Hegel, who wrote at the tail end of the German idealist period, was 
also influenced by the work of Immanuel Kant
60
 and Kant’s theory of property as an 
acquired right to something held in common, over which one asserts a free will to 
possess.
61
  Intellectual property scholars have also relied on Kant to find support for an 
author’s property right in the work.
62
 
¶14  Whether one relies on the works of Locke, Kant, or Hegel, one will arrive at the 
same conclusion that there are natural rights that belong to the author and exist even if 
they are not explicitly recognized by a legal system and made into a legal right.  One may 
agree that there is a natural right to life and that it is morally and ethically wrong to take 
the life of another, even without laws making it a crime to commit murder.
63
  Likewise, 
in the same way that one may agree that, even in the absence of First Amendment 
guarantees, it is morally and ethically wrong to impose undue restraints on another 
person’s ability to speak freely because one recognizes an individual’s inherent right to 
free speech, one may also agree that an individual in society has the right to own that 
 
54
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 45 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford 
University Press 1952) (1821) (“The principle that a thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first 
in time to take it into his possession is immediately self-explanatory and superfluous, because a second 
person cannot take into his possession what is already the property of another.  Since property is the 
embodiment of personality, my inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to make it 
my property; to secure this end occupancy is requisite.”) (endnote omitted). 
55
 Troutt, supra note 53, at 347. 
56
 For a comparison between both moral-rights based jurisdictions such as Germany and France and 
economic-rights based jurisdictions such as the United States, see Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability 
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347 
(1993). 
57
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
58
 California Art Preservation Act of 1980, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; New York Artists’ Authorship Act of 
1984, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03. 
59
 Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2009). 
60
 BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 730 (2007). 
61
 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 49 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 
University Press 1996) (1797) (“[A] right to a thing is a right to the private use of a thing of which I am in 
(original or instituted) possession in common with all others.”) (footnote omitted). 
62
 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 78–81 (2011); Thomas F. Cotter, 
Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on 
Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1062 (2008). 
63
 However, criminal laws often reflect the standards of morality. Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is 
Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 208 (1994) (“[T]he doctrines that comprise the ‘special part’ of 
the criminal law appear to track quite closely morality’s absolute prohibitions:  we are, for example, 
enjoined by both the criminal law and morality not to kill, rape, maim, torture, abuse, or frighten other 
persons.”). 
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which he produced—whether produced through manual or intellectual labor.
64
  In some 
sense, a thing produced from intellectual labor may be more “connected” to the 
personality or individuality of its creator than something created through manual labor.  
The resulting product would be more deserving of a natural property right, allowing its 
owner to control how society uses the product.  Such a right should exist even if there are 
no laws specifically protecting or recognizing that right. 
¶15   There is a difference between a natural right and a legal right; one must take care 
to distinguish between these two.  A right created by law (a legal right) is a different type 
of right than a basic, fundamental, or intrinsic right (a natural right).  Sometimes legal 
rights affirm natural rights, but not always.  Laws prohibiting the willful taking of 
another’s life, for example, affirm the individual’s natural human right to life.  On the 
other hand, laws facilitating genocide—while still laws
65
—do not.  Whether the laws are 
proper in the first place is beyond the scope of this Article.
66
  For this Article’s purposes, 
it suffices to note that the laws of a legal system can support, deny, or simply ignore 
man’s natural expectation of a fundamental way of living, regardless of whether one 
accepts the basic premise that an individual possesses certain natural and imprescriptible 
rights.  The copyright system—a legal institution charged with the sole purpose of 
promoting progress in society
67
—is no exception.  Just because an author’s natural 
expectation of literary property is not explicitly acknowledged by the copyright system 
does not mean that it does not exist. 
¶16  In English and American copyright systems, this expectation of a natural literary 
property right appears to have been quashed by judicial application of early copyright 
statutes.  The earliest statutory codifications of copyright as an exclusive right to print, 
publish, and distribute literary works in the United Kingdom and in the United States 
occurred in the 1700s with the Statute of Anne and the 1790 Copyright Act, respectively.  
Following the enactment of both statutes, the highest courts in each legal system declared 
 
64
 Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property 
Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1402 (2010). 
65
 For accounts of the Nuremberg Laws, see, for example, MARION A. KAPLAN, BETWEEN DIGNITY AND 
DESPAIR: JEWISH LIFE IN NAZI GERMANY (1998); LENI YAHIL, THE HOLOCAUST: THE FATE OF EUROPEAN 
JEWRY, 1932–1945, at 67–73 (Ina Friedman & Haya Galai trans., 1990). 
66
 This question about the moral content of laws strikes at the heart of legal theory and the study of what 
law really is.  Legal positivism postulates that laws do not necessarily have to abide by particular moral 
standards for them to be considered proper and valid “laws.”  The idea that men possess certain natural and 
imprescriptible rights is nothing more than “rhetorical nonsense” and “nonsense upon stilts” to a legal 
positivist. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Nonsense Upon Stilts, or Pandora’s Box Opened, or the French 
Declaration of Rights Prefixed to the Constitution of 1791 Laid Open and Exposed—With a Comparative 
Sketch of What Has Been Done on the Same Subject in the Constitution of 1795, and a Sample of Citizen 
Sieyès, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: 
NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 317, 330 (Philip Schofield et 
al. eds., 2002).  Natural lawyers, on the other hand, see laws as necessarily embodying a specific moral 
content.  Laws that ignore or reject moral precepts of justice, fairness, or righteousness should not be 
considered laws in the true sense—even if passed by the legislature or declared by the courts of a legitimate 
legal system.  The maxim lex injusta non est lex (“an unjust law is not a law”) defines a natural lawyer’s 
position on this issue. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 364 (2d ed. 2011).  A 
contemporary debate on this point is seen in Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
67
 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary 
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’”). 
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that these statutes were the only sources of rights to literary works and explicitly denied 
the existence of the author’s natural literary property right.
68
  Following the House of 
Lords’s decision, the United States Supreme Court announced in 1834 that Congress 
creates all rights to literary works in the United States—none exist at common law, save 
for a very specific and limited right to first publication for works that were not yet 
published.
69
  While these cases have been cited as settling the question of literary 
property,
70
 the specific factual scenarios from which these cases emerged raise 
uncertainty as to the exact judicial determination about the nature of an author’s rights in 
creative works.  Donaldson v. Beckett involved a dispute between two booksellers over 
the exclusive right to reprint James Thomson’s classic, The Seasons—a dispute that did 
not involve the author.
71
  The respondent, Thomas Beckett, on behalf of various London 
booksellers and printers, claimed the exclusive right to print and make copies of the book 
was a perpetual entitlement, which the publisher procured through the author’s 
assignment of copyright.
72
  The common law right at issue in this case was the specific 
right to print and publish the work, which Thomson assigned to his publisher.  The notion 
of literary property, when used by booksellers and printers in this case, referred to the 
rights to print, publish, and sell—the same specific rights protected under the Statute of 
Anne.  The question of literary property in Donaldson v. Beckett did not seek to 
determine the character of an author’s natural expectation to have control over his 
identity as expressed in the work.  The questions posed were simply not structured to 
answer what rights an author has over that which he creates.  For example, the first legal 
question asked “[w]hether, at common law, an author of any book or literary composition 
had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for sale, and might bring an 
action against any person who printed, published, and sold the same without his 
consent.”
73
  Subsequent questions posed to the House were also not structured to answer 
the question about the author’s rights.
74
  Instead, the notion of authors’ natural rights was 
 
68
 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 
(H.L.) (Gr. Brit.); see also U.S. Copyright Act 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, 
c.19.  
69
 Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661. 
70
 See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Statue of Anne: An American Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 889, 900 
(2010) (“[T]he debate [on literary property] was formally concluded with the decision of the House of 
Lords in Donaldson v. Becket . . . .  While Wheaton v. Peters had some aspects that were peculiar to the 
United States, the main question of copyright as a common law property right was identical to that litigated 
in the British literary property debate, and most of the opposing sides’ arguments on this issue were 
duplication of that debate.  When a majority of the Supreme Court ruled against common law copyright, 
hope of achieving recognition of absolute property rights through this channel dwindled.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Invention: Patent as Knowledge Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
71, 86–87 (2011) (“Wheaton v. Peters was the first major opinion of the Court to deal with copyright, and 
as copyright scholars know well, the Court concluded that the federal copyright statute, with its limited 
term and scope of rights, extinguished the concept of literary property with respect to works that fell within 
its scope.  This brought American law into line with its English cousin [Donaldson v. Beckett].”); Marybeth 
Peters, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 509, 512 (2007) (stating that 
“[t]he controversy over what was meant by ‘secure’ in the Copyright Clause was settled in Wheaton, and I 
don’t believe anybody proposes to fight that battle again” on the Court’s decision that Congress was 
legislating a new right instead of acknowledging an existing right in common law with the passing of the 
1790 Copyright Act). 
71
 Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 838. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 846 (emphasis added). 
74
 For the five questions that the House of Lords was asked to answer, see id. at 846–47. 
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introduced in the case to support the economic rights to print and publish creative 
works.
75
  The House rejected this notion in order to prevent booksellers’ monopolistic 
control of the publishing industry.
76
  The House never drew a distinction between 
authors’ natural rights and publishers’ economic interests (that is, between literary 
property and statutory privileges)
77
 and the case should not be read as suggesting that the 
only rights authors have in a work are explicitly provided by statute.
78
  Similarly, 
Wheaton v. Peters addressed specific facts that left the question of literary property 
largely unanswered.  The disputants in this case were Supreme Court reporters who asked 
the Court to determine whether common law property rights protected the publication and 
sale of previously reported decisions.
79
  The Supreme Court decided this case in its 
formative years, when Justices sought the widest dissemination of the law.
80
  Deciding in 
favor of a common law property right for a court reporter would have restricted free 
speech and press in a newly formed country dedicated to the promotion of ideas and 
debate for progress.
81
  At that specific point in American history, the Court had no choice 
but to decide that a perpetual property right in court reports would expire as soon as they 
were published and that statutory copyright would protect the exclusive right to publish 
and vend such reports after publication.  Given the dispute over the exclusive rights of 
publication and sale, the fact pattern in Wheaton v. Peters, as in Donaldson v. Beckett, did 
 
75
 The questions were structured to deal with the specific claim that booksellers had an exclusive right to 
print and publish books purchased from individual authors in perpetuity.  Edward Thurlow, the Attorney 
General, in his opening remarks for Donaldson observed: 
The booksellers . . . had not, till lately, ever concerned themselves about authors, but had 
generally confined the substance of their prayers to the legislature, to the security of their 
own property; nor would they probably have, of late years, introduced the authors as 
parties in their claims to the common law right of exclusively multiplying copies, had not 
they found it necessary to give a colourable face to their monopoly. 
17 PARL. HIST. ENG., H.L. (1774) 953, 954 (Gr. Brit.). 
76
 Professor Patterson states this “was the only decision which would destroy the monopoly of the 
booksellers, and there is little question that the decision was directly aimed at that monopoly.” PATTERSON, 
supra note 1, at 177–78.  Patterson then cites Lord Camden’s statement that “[a]ll our learning will be 
looked [sic] up in the hands of the Tonsons and [sic] Lintons of the age, who will set what price upon it 
their avarice chuses to demand, till the public become as much their slaves, as their own hackney compilers 
are.” Id. at 178 (quoting 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. at 1000). 
77
 Patterson, supra note 50, at 18 (“[I]t is important to remember what copyright entailed and did not 
entail at that time.  At the time copyright owners had the exclusive right to publish works as those works 
were written, but only for a limited period of time—fourteen years with a possible renewal term of an 
additional fourteen years.  Copyright owners did not have the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, 
such as abridgements, translations, or digests.  The distinction between the use of the copyright and the use 
of the work, therefore, was fundamental.”). 
78
 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 174 (“The actual holding of the Donaldson case is that the author’s 
common-law right to the sole printing, publishing, and vending of his works, a right which he could assign 
in perpetuity, is taken away and supplanted by the Statute of Anne.  The case did not hold that the author’s 
rights at common law consisted only of the right of printing, publishing, and vending his works . . . .”). 
79
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 593–94 (1834). 
80
 See Craig Joyce, “A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature”: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of 
the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2005). 
81
 Id. at 384–85 (“In a case that saddened and pained the Justices themselves even as they rendered a 
decision indispensable to the progress of a national jurisprudence, the Court assured that henceforth 
American law should be owned by no one—and thus owned by all, for the benefit of all.  In retrospect, in a 
nation dedicated to free speech, free press, and the widest possible dissemination and debate of facts and 
ideas, the outcome could not have been otherwise.”). 
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not give the Court the opportunity to consider the broader natural rights of an author 
beyond his statutory rights to publish and sell his work.
82
 
¶17  Whether one chooses to believe that judges create binding law or merely declare 
existing law as cases come before them,
83
 one jurisprudential point remains to be made 
for the purposes of this Article.  The author’s literary property right in the work does not 
cease to exist simply because copyright statute or judicial decisions do not explicitly 
acknowledge that right exists by law—a natural right exists even without legal 
affirmation.  An author’s literary right at common law would be evidenced through 
customary practices, as with the publication contracts discussed, and through natural 
expectations that evolve from the interactions of authors with their publishers and the 
public.  The author’s expectation of a literary property right cannot be nullified by a more 
limited recognition of a specific right to publish and sell the work.  Statutes, which are 
enacted for specific policy purposes, and case law, which is peculiar to distinctive factual 
patterns, cannot possibly represent the full spectrum of rights that may arise from an 
individual’s creation of a literary or artistic work.  The enactment of a law by Congress 
that denies the humanity of men may be law, but that would not change the natural fact 
that men are human beings by nature.  In the same way, a literary property right, if it 
exists as a natural right, does not have to be expressly validated by positive copyright law 
for it to be a legitimate expectation or interest.  The express recognition of particular 
statutory privileges to publish and sell a work exclusively should not be taken to suggest 
that these privileges constitute all of the rights that authors have in their work.  Nor 
should it be assumed that literary property and statutory copyright are mutually exclusive 
principles protecting separate interests of an author at different times along a seamless 
continuum of events that begins at the initial conception of a creative idea and that ends 
with the dissemination of the expression to the public.  It is important to see how the 
distinction between an author’s natural interest in how the work is used and economic 
 
82
 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 4, at 64 (“[Wheaton’s] holding was a simplistic solution to a 
complex problem:  How to protect the author’s interest in his or her work without at the same time 
providing the bookseller an unregulated monopoly.  This monopoly, of course, is based on the fallacy that 
ownership of the work is ownership of the copyright and vice versa . . . .”). 
83
 Whether judges create or merely declare the law is a contentious issue in jurisprudence.  John 
Chipman Gray, for example, is well known for his belief that judges create, rather than discover, the law. 
See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 96 (1909) (“[T]he absurdity of the 
view of Law preëxistent to its declaration is obvious.”); see also THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 321 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“Sometimes judges 
make federal common law to govern specific issues, as when they fill a gap in a federal statutory 
scheme.”).  Other scholars are inclined to believe that judges merely declare existing laws or norms that are 
discoverable or act in the capacity of a rule-making agency of the state. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 150 (Anders Wedberg trans., Lawbook Exchange 2009) (1945) (arguing that 
courts always apply pre-existing law, stating that the view “that there is no law existing before the judicial 
decision and that all law is created by the courts” is false); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
132 (1961) (“In a system where stare decisis [the doctrine of precedent] is firmly acknowledged, this 
function of the courts is very like the exercise of delegated rule-making powers by an administrative 
body.”).  For a natural-rights oriented perspective on this issue, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 87 (1977) (“[J]udicial decisions enforce existing political rights,” which “depend[] upon both 
the practice and justice of [a civil society’s] political institutions.”).  This issue on the role of courts, 
however, bears very little impact on the discussion in this Article, which aims to demonstrate the existence 
of a broader literary right besides the rights recognized by copyright statutes and case law.  Whether statute 
and precedent are morally right or not, and whether they accurately represent law and norms, is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  It suffices to assume that a literary property right is a natural right that may or may 
not be affirmed by the legislature or judiciary. 
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interests, naturally arising from the work’s publication and public dissemination, is 
blurred when courts state that literary property only protects a right to first publication 
before a work is published and that statutory copyright protects the author’s exclusive 
rights to print and sell the work post-publication.
84
  Literary property would be an interest 
that authors continue to have even after a publisher commits to publishing and 
disseminating their work.  Accepting that there could possibly be a natural right that 
protects an author’s literary property will result in significant changes to copyright 
jurisprudence because this will, as Professor Lyman Ray Patterson believes, clarify the 
inconsistency in ideas and values, which plague copyright law.
85
 
C. Protecting Authors’ Identity and Creative Rights 
¶18  The acceptance of the author’s natural literary property right raises a new set of 
normative questions that must be answered:  (1) what would literary property rights 
protect?; (2) would such rights be alienable in the same way as statutory copyright?; and 
(3) how would natural rights, if not explicitly recognized by the copyright system, be 
statutorily protected?  These questions should be answered carefully if the protection of 
an author’s literary property at common law is to reconcile some of the inconsistencies 
among institutional values (such as whether copyright should protect the author or 
promote learning) that Professor Patterson identified in the copyright system.
86
  
Furthermore, the disparity in expressive power among authors, publishers, and consumers 
of creative works, which could fundamentally affect society’s ability to learn, conduct 
research, and communicate, potentially hampering the progress of science and useful arts 
in the long run,
87
 may be narrowed by solutions to these normative questions.  Also, 
copyright pessimists in England and the United States, who see authors’ rights as an 
extension of the copyright monopoly in a creative work, might resist the proposition to 
create a literary property right for authors.
88
  Commentators, such as then-Professor (now 
 
84
 See, e.g., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (“At common-law the 
exclusive right to copy existed in the author until he permitted a general publication.  Thus, when a book 
was published in print, the owner’s common-law right was lost.  At common-law an author had a property 
in his manuscript, and might have an action against any one who undertook to publish it without authority.  
The statute created a new property right, giving to the author, after publication, the exclusive right to 
multiply copies for a limited period.”); Tribune Co. of Chi. v. Associated Press, 116 F. 126, 127 (C.C.N.D. 
Ill. 1900) (“Literary property is protected at common law to the extent only of possession and use of the 
manuscript and its first publication by the owner . . . .  With voluntary publication the exclusive right is 
determined at common law, and the statutory copyright is the sole dependence of the author or owner for a 
monopoly in the future publication.”). 
85
 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 220 (“There is little doubt that a recognition of authors’ creative rights 
could reshape American copyright law, not by changing fundamental ideas, but by bringing those ideas into 
proper recognition and perspective, and doing so consistently with the copyright statute.”). 
86
 Id. at 181 (the four basic ideas that Patterson identified as underlying early American copyright law 
are:  (1) to protect the author’s rights; (2) to promote learning; (3) to provide order in the book trade as a 
government grant; and (4) to prevent harmful monopolies). 
87
 See, e.g., John M. Kernochan, Practical Limitations on Authors’ Rights, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
263, 267–68 (2001); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2010); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, 
Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319 (2003). 
88
 Borrowing a term coined by Paul Goldstein to describe a position taken regarding the fundamental 
purpose of copyright laws. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 11 (rev. ed. 2003) (“[C]opyright pessimists . . . see copyright’s cup as half empty:  
they accept that copyright owners should get some measure of control over copies as an incentive to 
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Justice) Breyer, have expressed doubt regarding the necessity of copyright incentives to 
encourage the production of artistic works.
89
  These commentators may challenge the 
claim that literary property rights must be recognized to protect the author’s natural 
noneconomic interest in the work.  Possible objections to the notion of authors’ literary 
property rights as proposed here can be broadly characterized into three distinct camps:  
(1) that literary property will support greater expansion of exclusive rights over creative 
works; (2) that the protection of the author’s natural rights will affirm the unrealistic 
notion of the romantic author; and (3) that the subject matter of literary property 
(information) should be available for public use.  However, this Article argues that these 
objections are unsustainable if one gives careful thought to the scope of literary 
property’s protection and what its recognition will accomplish in the copyright system. 
1. Objections to Protecting Author’s Literary Property Rights 
¶19  The first objection to a notion of literary property is based on the idea that some 
may use the recognition of this right to justify the expansion of copyright.  English 
booksellers historically argued to expand economic rights to the exclusive use of the 
work based on moral and ethical arguments in favor of authors’ rights.  Similarly, the 
normative argument for literary property was, and continues to be, utilized by 
corporations and entities other than the author to justify the expansion and perpetuation 
of an economic monopoly to profit from the publication and sale of the work to the 
public.
90
  More recently, some have used such normative arguments to endorse 
Congress’s extension of the copyright term for an additional twenty years
91
 to benefit not 
just individual authors, but media publishers and corporate copyright owners as well.  
The objection to the notion of literary property on this basis may be allayed by clarifying 
that the rights of the individual author, rooted in natural law, are fundamentally distinct 
from the statutory grant that legislatures provide to facilitate the dissemination of creative 
works to the public by protecting economic investments.
92
  There should be no 
 
produce creative works, but they would like copyright to extend only as far as is necessary to give this 
incentive, and treat anything more as an encroachment on the general freedom of everyone to write and say 
what they please.”). 
89
 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282 (1970) (“It would be possible, for instance, to do without 
copyright, relying upon authors, publishers, and buyers to work out arrangements among themselves that 
would provide books’ creators with enough money to produce them.  Authors in ancient times, as well as 
monks and scholars in the middle ages, wrote and were paid for their writings without copyright 
protection.”). 
90
 John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP 
(Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 15 (2011); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as 
Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 665, 705 (1992); see also Patterson, supra note 50, at 52 (“[T]he notion of copyright as property 
serves as the basis for the continued expansion of copyright to the benefit of the entrepreneur.”). 
91
 See Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 224 (discussing 
arguments put forth to support the Copyright Term Extension Act); Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The 
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
651, 694 (2000) (“If you provide the proper incentives today, it will not enhance my productivity in the 
past, but it may promote my productivity in the future.  In other words, I may stay and continue to write or 
do my scholarly thing today because, yesterday, Congress enacted a statute that enhances my reward.”). 
92
 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 37–41 (2003). 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 548
intellectual or logical bridge between an author’s natural right to the protection of his 
individuality in a society and the economic rights that the state grants to encourage 
creative production.  Once it becomes clear that the author’s natural rights and copyright 
have distinctly separate legal definitions, it is likely that the fear of perpetual extension of 
copyright (as the exclusive rights to print and disseminate creative works instead of the 
right to control use of content) will subside due to the awareness of copyright’s inability 
to control public uses of a work’s content.  Such control over the use of a work’s content 
would only belong to the author. 
¶20  The second potential objection to protecting the author’s literary property stems 
from commentators, who have rejected the commonly accepted version of the solitary 
author from the Romantic period as an unrealistic representation of how authors and 
creator produce creative works in reality.  These conceptions envisioned the author 
producing works from thin air or through divine inspiration and epitomizes the greatness 
and splendor of pure human creativity.  Northrop Frye described this individual creator as 
being “interested in himself, not necessarily out of egotism, but because the basis of his 
poetic skill is individual, and hence genetic and psychological,”
93
 which provides an 
excellent premise for the recognition of literary property.  Sheer creative genius, as the 
thinking goes, should be rewarded and encouraged through the Copyright Act’s grant of 
exclusive rights.  The grant is temporary so that once these rights expire, the products of 
such creative genius becomes accessible to the general public.
94
 
¶21  The problem with this line of thinking is that its faith in the genius creator, who 
produces a unique and highly original work and is thus entitled to certain rights, runs 
contrary to expressed skepticism about the author being personally and solely responsible 
for his creative expression.  Michel Foucault, for example, famously described the 
individual author as a culturally concocted “fiction” to provide discourses with particular 
social statuses or modes of existing in society.  The author is not someone who creates 
from an inspired source of intelligence and freely shares his creation with the world, but 
rather one who appropriates and controls the proliferation of discourses in society 
through the claim of authorship.
95
  Similarly, Roland Barthes, who famously proclaimed 
the death of the author, suggests that a reader should interpret a text independently of the 
author’s background and experience.  To Barthes, placing emphasis on the author to 
 
93
 NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 60 (1957). 
94
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that temporary 
rights of copyright law are “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 
(1948) (“[R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his 
creative genius.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (“A copyright . . . is ‘at once the 
equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals 
and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’”) (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 322, 328 (1858)). 
95
 Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-
STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 159 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979) (“We are used to thinking that the author 
is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he 
speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely.  The truth is quite the contrary:  the author 
is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a 
certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which 
one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and 
recomposition of fiction.”). 
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understand a text is misplaced; instead, Barthes felt that textual interpretation should 
focus on the readers as the recipients and interpreters of the work.
96
  Legal scholars have 
proposed theories similar to those of Foucault and Barthes, contending that the author is a 
socially constructed metaphor to serve a particular cultural purpose, which is to support 
the commodification of literature in the eighteenth century
97
 and establish the author’s 
proprietary ownership over original expressions.
98
  In turn, the fulfillment of these 
cultural goals, supports the expansion of copyright to include most intellectual creation, 
and the enforcement of proprietary rights prevents social uses of the work for education, 
development, and progression in society.
99
  Yet, contrary to the fear that property rights 
will stifle innovation, this Article argues that literary property rights will promote societal 
progress through the encouragement of authentic expressions that will have a more 
positive and constructive impact on how society develops. 
¶22  Creative works that do not necessarily promote progress and diversity in expression 
might have a detrimental effect on society.  In reality, authors promote progress in society 
by expressing themselves in an authentic manner.  Why would critics use the fact that all 
creators borrow from their predecessors and surroundings in the act of creation to debunk 
the myth of the Romantic author and then decry the expansion of copyright?  The notion 
of the Romantic author might, as suggested by Professor Lionel Bently, introduce 
reasonable limitations to copyright expansion.
100
  The notion that authorship emanates 
 
96
 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 148 (Stephen Heath trans., 
1977) (“[A] text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations 
of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is 
the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author.  The reader is the space on which all the quotations that 
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination.”). 
97
 WOODMANSEE, supra note 10, at 37.  Professor Woodmansee explains that eighteenth-century 
theorists stopped thinking of the author as a craftsman inspired by God in order to establish a commercial 
market in literary works: 
They minimized the element of craftsmanship (in some instances they simply discarded 
it) in favor of the element of inspiration, and they internalized the source of that 
inspiration.  That is, the inspiration for a work came to be regarded as emanating not from 
outside or above, but from within the writer himself.  ‘Inspiration’ came to be explicated 
in terms of original genius, with the consequences that the inspired work was made 
peculiarly and distinctively the product—and the property—of the writer. 
Id.  
98
 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 54 (1996) (“Originality became the watchword of artistry and the warrant for 
property rights.”); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 
DUKE L.J. 455, 472 (“The ‘authorship’ concept, with its roots in notions of individual self-proprietorship, 
provided the rationale for thinking of literary productions as personal property with various associated 
attributes including alienability.”). 
99
 Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 228, 230 (2007) (“The authorship myth that animates copyright discourse 
supports calls for wide protection and generates complacency around the expanding domain of intellectual 
property and the corporate ownership that dominates the intellectual realm. . . .  The problem highlighted 
here is the power of the individual authorship trope to occlude discussion of the social, educational, or 
cultural value of downstream or derivative uses of protected works.  Because copyright’s concept of the 
work resides in independent, original production, the work of a second-generation producer cannot compete 
equally as a ‘work’ of social value that merits protection; the social importance or the cultural value of the 
second text barely comes within the cognizance of the law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
100
 See Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
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from a human author and not a corporate persona would set limits to the type of work that 
may be protected, the level or threshold of protection, the breadth of rights granted, the 
length of protection, and the distribution and enforcement of rights.
101
  The notion of 
authorship will also provide new direction for copyright reform.
102
  Moreover, the 
connection of an author with his work through the notion of literary property would make 
the author directly responsible for his creation and its impact on society.  Deconstructing 
the notion of romantic authorship to point out flaws in the legal system and suggest that 
most authors create by reusing works that have already been created ignores the 
importance of original and authentic expressions and produces a social expectation that 
creative works should be alike.  When authors are not expected to be original, they would 
more likely than not produce the same types of works that have little influence on society 
and the progress of science and useful arts.  Making authors identify with their creations 
through a Romantic vision of authorship and the notion of literary property will likely 




¶23  The third possible objection to the notion of literary property is that information—
the subject matter of its protection—should be a resource that is held commonly by 
society and not subjected to private property.  From an economic viewpoint, property 
rights counter the overuse that usually follows when a limited resource is commonly held.  
The “tragedy of the commons,”
104
 where everyone consumes a resource without caring 
for it or investing in it until it is depleted completely, may best be avoided by the 
allocation of private property rights, which defines ownership and draws boundaries 
around the resource to limit its overuse through a clear right to exclude.  However, some 
scholars point out that there are merits to having particular resources held in common
105
 
and identify the under-exploitation of a resource as a serious problem when too many 
 
ARTS 1 (2008). 
101
 See id. at 92–103. 
102
 Id. at 103. 
103
 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 56, at 429.  Professor Netanel suggests that an author not only has 
rights but responsibilities towards society: 
Truly, the author has a duty to the community, as well as to herself, to use language in a 
manner that reflects her own ideas and sensitivities.  This requires that the author speak 
with personal integrity, and with a measure of respect and awe for the significance and 
power of her enterprise.  She must recognize that each exercise of her artistic discretion 
embodies a moral decision that obliges her to produce her best work in her own unique 
way.  At a minimum, the author is obliged to take responsibility for her work.  She should 
not abdicate to another the right to determine whether and in what form her work is 
communicated to the public.  She has a certain duty to maintain her autonomy and 
authenticity of expression in the face of opposing political, social or market pressures. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
104
 The classic explanation of the tragedy of the commons is the overexploitation and consumption of a 
common resource that ultimately leads to its depletion. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
105
 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) (property rights sometimes vests with the general public instead of a 
private individual where it facilitates socialization among members of a society; here there is no tragedy of 
the commons as there is benefit to having resources publicly owned as society as a whole benefits from the 
sharing of that particular resource). 
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property rights protect a given resource.
106
  In certain cases, a resource that serves a 
particular social function may be considered inherently public property.  Speech is a 
prime candidate for protection as public property, given its role in helping communities 
and society govern themselves.
107
  Against this background, intellectual property scholars 
have emphasized the need for an “intellectual commons” that is free from the restraints of 




¶24  The argument for recognizing literary property as a natural right protected by law 
might also generate disapproval from critics of copyright expansionism.  These critics 
argue that the increase of property rights in resources that should be public property 
would limit the public domain, which contains information, ideas, and knowledge not 
subject to intellectual property protection that are freely available for creative reuse.
109
  
The importance of freedom of information in intellectual creation has inspired a few 
intellectual property scholars to work on constructing a “cultural commons” to manage 
informational resources and support the pooling and sharing of these resources.
110
  
Protecting the author’s literary property could be seen as potentially supporting the 
expansion of proprietary rights in informational resources that should rightfully be 
available to society as part of the cultural commons. 
¶25  Despite critic’s fear of expansionism, literary property would not limit the use of 
creative expression, as feared by critics of copyright expansionism.  First, the expansion 
of copyright is unlikely to affect the use of creative works if rights are exercised in a 
reasonable and moderate fashion.  An author, for example, should enforce literary 
property rights only if a use of his work undermines his integrity or personality—who he 
 
106
 Id. at 749–50 (identifying holdouts and monopolies as primary problems with privatization).  For the 
leading legal work on the anticommons, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property 
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) (“When there are too many 
owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons.  
Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, but it can appear whenever governments 
create new property rights.”) (footnote omitted). 
107
 Rose, supra note 105, at 778. 
108
 Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 
500–01 (2003) (applying anticommons analysis to use of Internet space); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1193–94 (1998) (applying 
anticommons analysis to intellectual property); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing how 
privatization of biomedical research and patenting of research results could lead to overlapping patent 
claims that restrict access to biomedical information). 
109
 Scholars have called for the resistance against the second enclosure movement into the public 
domain. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (describing how information is becoming 
subject to private control); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003) (“We are in the middle of a second enclosure 
movement.  It sounds grandiloquent to call it ‘the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind,’ but in 
a very real sense that is just what it is.  True, the new state-created property rights may be ‘intellectual’ 
rather than ‘real,’ but once again things that were formerly thought of as either common property or 
uncommodifiable are being covered with new, or newly extended, property rights.”) (footnote omitted); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783 (2002); see also LEWIS HYDE, 
COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP (2010) (stating that history and convention demands 
easy access to common knowledge and information). 
110
 Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning 
Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (2010) (commenting on the idea of a “cultural commons”). 
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is as a creator—and contradicts his intention for producing and distributing the work to 
society.  Second, the placement of checks and balances, such as subjecting the exercise of 
rights to a reasonable standard and insisting that rights cannot be used to harm legitimate 
public interests in the use of the work, into the law as it expands may be sufficient to 
address the problems associated with property expansion.  Literary property should not 
be considered a threat to the prerequisite freedom some scholars see as essential to 
second-generation creativity.  Literary property connects an author with his work on a 
visceral level because it protects the author’s individuality and personality rather than a 
share of the copyright market.  A property right in the work that gives an author 
autonomous control over his individual expression should encourage authors to create 
their best work, in a responsible way for society’s benefit and to instill the desire in 
creators of new works to use a predecessor’s work responsibly without infringing on 
literary property rights.  Similarly, adopting a literary property right would not enclose 
the commons; rather it would encourage the production of works that are more authentic, 
which will ultimately increase cultural and informational resources in the public domain. 
2. The Subject-Matter of Literary Property 
¶26  A literary property right as proposed in this Article would not protect an author’s 
commercial interest, although it may well support its existence.
111
  The right to 
commercially exploit a work has been capably addressed by copyright legislation, in that 
the creator of a work is the first owner of copyright.  Conversely, literary property 
protects the author’s identity and personality as expressed and contained in a published 
work.
112
  Thus, the subject matter of literary property would be the author’s creative 
interest as held by the work.  Hence, Milton’s contractual obligation to refrain from 
interfering with the publication of his work was an agreement to not enforce a literary 
property right.  If the right protects the author’s personality and creative identity, rather 
than the economic aspects of literary and artistic production, there will be very little room 
for authors to abuse such a right and foreclose reasonable societal uses of the work.  Yet, 
at the same time, protecting the author’s integrity and autonomy frees the author from 
worrying about abuse of the work and allows for greater authenticity in expression. 
¶27  The motivation for human creativity should not be reduced to economic or 
monetary values.  As scholars have pointed out, authors, unlike publishers, may be driven 
and inspired by non-monetary considerations.
113
  There is a dire need to harness these 
 
111
 A more specific right to use property, such as a right to commercially exploit, should be based on a 
broader entitlement in the property. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 10 (“The stationer’s copyright can be 
analogized to a perpetual lease of personal property, a manuscript or copy . . . for one specific purpose, that 
of publishing.  The right of publishing, however, did not vest the ownership of a work itself in the ordinary 
sense, for this would have given the holder of the right of publishing other rights incident to ownership.”); 
see also id. at 218 (“The creative interest is a natural right of the author . . . .  While that natural right was 
deemed to be the economic interest of the author, it was not so limited.”). 
112
 Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1884 (1990). 
113
 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE 
UNITED STATES (2010); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151 (2007) (describing creative inspiration as culturally inspired); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 
(2006) (identifying spiritual and inspirational motivations for creativity); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s 
Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 
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noneconomic motivations for creativity and channel them into literary and artistic 
production.  Originality should not be attacked as being unrepresentative of the reality of 
creative production.  Second, third, and fourth generation creators, who build upon and 
reuse the works of earlier authors, may still be original in their presentation and 
interpretation of existing works.
114
  This Article proposes that the law should not 
underestimate the power of many individuals expressing themselves in authentic and 
sincere ways to impact the progress of society in a profoundly positive manner; 
protecting the author’s creative interest is the first step in that direction.  The protection 
of creative interests is particularly important, in part because the Internet and digital 
technologies cause authors’ integrity and autonomy to become more vulnerable.  The 
victimization of one’s avatar in the virtual game Second Life,
115
 the defacement of 
artwork distributed online,
116
 can damage an author’s reputation and leave society with 
inauthentic works or misleading information.
117
  Currently, an author has no real legal 




69 LA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (recognizing that the creation of some works may be motivated by non-monetary 
incentives and proposing that for such works, fair use be more readily available as a defense against 
infringement); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (questioning the actual link between commercial incentives and 
creativity); see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (describing how digital networks encourage creativity that 
produces non-proprietary work with no real monetary rewards). 
114
 One can be entirely original in how one reinterprets existing artwork and literature. 
115
 Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar’s Day in Court: A Proposal for Obtaining Relief and Resolving Disputes in 
Virtual World Games, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2007 (describing how an avatar—a representation of 
who one is in an online community—can be victimized by other players without any real legal 
consequence). 
116
 The defacement of artwork may be an act of artistic rebellion against conventional cultural 
representations. See Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 493 (2006) 
(Professor Katyal describes the vandalism and defacement of public messages as a trend towards “semiotic 
disobedience,” where “today’s generation seeks to alter existing intellectual property by interrupting, 
appropriating, and then replacing the passage of information from creator to consumer. . . .  [T]hese recent 
artistic practices . . . often involve the conscious and deliberate re-creation of property through 
appropriative and expressive acts that consciously risk violating the law that governs intellectual or tangible 
property.”); Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 80 (2001) (describing defacement of company websites as “a form of political activism 
against globalism and corporate control of the Internet” and hackers of Internet-posted materials as 
“reject[ing] societal ideas of intellectual property”). 
117
 Deliberately altering information and data that an author has shared online will misinform the 
author’s targeted audience, who will expect reliable information. See Blodwen Tarter, Information 
Liability: New Interpretations for the Electronic Age, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 481, 484 (1992) (“Information 
consumers want reliable data on which to base decisions. . . .  With the advent of broad electronic 
distribution of data, however, has come an attitude change. . . .  [T]he myth of machine infallibility seems 
to create a demand for a higher standard of quality for machine-readable data than for traditionally 
distributed information.”).  As more and more information and data become accessible through the Internet, 
there is a greater responsibility for authors of information and knowledge to make sure that data distributed 
online is reliable and accurate. See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed 
Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003) (describing the need for accurate, reliable, and accessible data in 
scientific research). 
118
 Some remedies may be available through the online service provider’s end user license agreement or 
terms of service.  The adequacy of these remedies to protect an author’s creative interest is questionable as 
these agreements regulate the relationship between service provider and user and are enforced by the 
service provider.  Courts have yet to decide on the enforceability of these agreements in a court of law 
although courts have decided that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. 621 
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  Courts have also 
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¶28  Because a literary property right protects an author’s creative interest, the right 
should not be alienable in the same way as statutory copyright rights.  Many scholars who 
believe that authors should have creative and personality rights to the use of their work 
see these personal rights as inalienable because they protect an author’s individuality or 
personality as expressed in a work.
119
  This is not surprising, since the author’s literary 
property right, with its genesis in natural law and the idea of personal autonomy, would 
fall within a category of rights that scholars and the law have long thought to be 
inalienable, such as the rights to life, personal liberty, and protection from gratuitous 
pain, as well as the satisfaction of basic needs, such as water, food, and healthcare.
120
  An 
author’s expression personifies his individuality and is so essential to the author 
flourishing as an autonomous creator capable of making positive contributions to society 
that all authentic expressions cannot, and should not, be treated as marketable 
commodities.  Because it is impossible to subtract an author’s sense of self from 
authentic and sincere self-expressions, a literary property right protecting such expression 
should not be alienable
121
 even if an author enters into a contract to sell that right.
122
  
Therefore, the rights that are alienable under the Copyright Act are specific rights to use 
the work and not the expression contained in the work in the same way that freedom and 
liberty are not alienable (one cannot sell oneself into slavery), whereas skill and labor are 
 
enforced open-source licenses. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
119
 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 219 (“The author . . . may appropriately be given broader 
protection than the publisher for the purpose of protecting his creative interest.  This interest is unique and 
appropriate for the author alone, and it should be recognized as a personal right, which is inalienable.”); 
Netanel, supra note 56, at 409–30 (arguing that an author’s right to autonomy should be inalienable 
because of power imbalances, the personal connection between creator and work, paternalism, and 
communitarian principles that are prevalent in the copyright system).  The Copyright Act has also made the 
right to terminate grants of copyright under § 203(a)(5) inalienable.  For discussion, see Peter S. Menell & 
David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 799, 814 (2010) (describing Congress’s policy of protecting authors from agreements made 
from a weaker bargaining position under § 203).  The Supreme Court has also affirmed the inalienable 
termination right of the author as provided by that statutory provision. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 
U.S. 483, 495 n.3 (2001) (referring to § 203(a)(5) as “inalienable authorial right to revoke a copyright 
transfer”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“The 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed 
term, but provides an inalienable termination right.”) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 302 (2006)). 
120
 See Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1788–89 (1988) 
(citing DIANA T. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: A DEFENSE (1985)). 
121
 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1905–06 (1987) 
(suggesting that some personal attributes cannot be separated and sold in the market place).  Professor 
Radin explains: 
Universal commodification undermines personal identity by conceiving of personal 
attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments as monetizable and 
alienable from the self.  A better view of personhood should understand many kinds of 
particulars—one’s politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, 
experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal attributes—as integral 
to the self.  To understand any of these as monetizable or completely detachable from the 
person . . . is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human. 
Id.  
122
 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 78–79 (1998) 
(arguing that one cannot enter into a contract to sell oneself into slavery because the object of the right—
freedom—cannot be transferred); see also TERRANCE MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF 
CONSENT IN MEDICINE AND THE LAW 8–9 (2000) (reviewing cases to establish that the inalienable right not 
to be killed cannot be contracted away even if the contract was freely entered into). 
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(one can contract to work and employment).  While statutory rights are often assigned by 
authors to publishers, literary property should always remain with the individual creator.  
The right is inherently tied to the author’s personality, an intrinsic and distinguishing 
attribute of the author, regardless of whether the work is newly conceived or a 
reinterpretation of another author’s work.  Each author’s distinctive personal mark in the 
work should also secure the creative interests of its author.  In this light, the “question of 
literary property” is less a commercial struggle between booksellers, as Mark Rose 
articulated,
123
 and more the separation of authors’ identities from publishers’ identities 
that should have been long disconnected. 
¶29  More important than whether the author’s literary property can be alienated is the 
question of how such a natural right, when not explicitly recognized by the copyright 
system, can be used to protect an author’s interest.  Philosophers who advocate legal 
positivism resist the legal recognition of a right merely because a social, cultural, or 
human expectation exists as a natural right.  Bentham, for example, rejected and 
denounced France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, famously saying that 
“[r]ight, the substantive right, is the child of law:  from real laws come real rights,” but 
only imaginary rights can come from “imaginary laws,” which he called the “laws of 
nature.”
124
  But other philosophers, who were highly regarded positivists, have 
acknowledged the possible existence of natural rights that can give birth to legal rights.  
One well-known scholar in U.S. jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, believed that moral or 
natural rights impose morally justifiable limitations on other people’s freedom in order to 
achieve equal distribution of human freedom across a given society.
125
  However, the 
existence and social recognition of natural rights does not necessarily impose an 
obligation on the state to convert these rights into legal rules, although states may take 
steps to give natural rights actual legal force.  While the recognition of a natural right, 
such as the literary property of the author, may inspire social support and even 
government endorsement, such conversion of a natural right into law can be a 
complicated undertaking.  Institutional commitment to enforcing a natural right as a legal 
right would necessarily follow this conversion.  But as Amartya Sen points out, social 
criticism, open discussion, and cultural change may be effective ways of protecting and 
enforcing natural rights without legislative action.
126
  Sen observes that natural human 
rights, such as a woman’s right to voice her opinion about how her family is raised and 
cared for, has “far-reaching ethical and political relevance,” which may be better 





 ROSE, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting FRANCIS HARGRAVE, IN DEFENCE OF LITERARY PROPERTY 7 (2d 
ed. 1774) (Gr. Brit.)). 
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 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued 
During the French Revolution, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 523 (John Bowring ed., 
Edinburgh, William Tait 1843); see also Amartya Sen, Rights, Laws and Language, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 437, 439 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Bentham’s views on natural rights). 
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 H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178 (1955) (“[I]t is I think a very 
important feature of a moral right that the possessor of it is conceived as having a moral justification for 
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 Sen, supra note 124, at 441–43 (discussing how natural rights have been more effectively enforced 
without legal rules and sanctions). 
127
 Id. at 443. 
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Similarly, the author’s natural right in his expression may be better protected and 
enforced by international organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization or non-governmental bodies, research centers, and 
academic institutions leading a change in social and cultural mindsets.  It would, 
however, still be worthwhile to consider the protection and enforcement of literary 
property as a legal right that the author alone holds.  There are two avenues to give legal 
force to an author’s natural right:  (1) Congress could pass specific legislation (or amend 
the copyright statute); or (2) courts could develop specific case law on authors’ rights. 
3. Making the Author’s Natural Right a Legal Right 
¶30  The primary objection to making the author’s natural right a legal right is the 
curtailment of other individual freedoms, such as the freedom to express one’s self or 
assert personal or political viewpoints.  Explicitly protecting literary property as a legal 
right would make it unlawful to destroy an artist’s painting or deface a sculpture outside 
the specific provisions of § 106A of the Copyright Act.
128
  But, as Professor Katyal 
points out, the destruction and vandalism of creative works may also be a “profoundly 
expressive” form of “semiotic disobedience.”
129
  If so, some may fear that the right to 
free expression could be limited to ensure authorial autonomy and security.  But even if 
an author’s natural right in his expression provides a moral justification to limit freedom 
of speech, amending copyright legislation to introduce literary property as a natural right 
would be practically impossible under current practices.  As Professor Jessica Litman 
points out, the legislative process for copyright law occurs at a negotiation table primarily 
with industry-dominated players with primarily economic interests.
130
  Therefore, one of 
the greatest challenges to introducing a moral and natural right into copyright legislation, 
as proposed in this Article, is its introduction in the negotiation process in copyright 
legislation drafting.  Unless there are significant voices pushing for a change in copyright 
legislation to protect the author’s rights during the negotiation process, the resulting 
legislation will be silent on the natural rights issues that authors may care about.
131
  
Statutory recognition of a creative right for authors would likely promote progress in the 
arts by providing authors greater security in how their expressions may be used and 
would likely advance society and culture by encouraging the production of authentic 
expressions.  However, the fact that such a right may infringe on other freedoms and 
constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press, may be an 
impediment to its recognition. 
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 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
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 Katyal, supra note 116, at 568–69. 
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 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–
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OR. L. REV. 275, 278 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change] 
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COPYRIGHT (2001). 
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¶31  Perhaps it makes more sense to rely on courts to develop case law on the author’s 
rights.  Then, courts could develop case law on the author’s creative interest as they arise 
on a case-by-case basis.  The development of the law in this area “will require perceptive 
analysis and careful distinction,” which Professor Patterson believes courts are in the best 
position to do.
132
  Further, Professor Patterson postulates that federal courts would be a 
better avenue than state courts to develop the author’s creative interest, since federal 
copyright law expressly preempts state copyright law.
133
  This Article argues that state 
courts might not be preempted from developing case law on the author’s rights under 
§ 301 of the Copyright Act for two reasons.
134
  First, the author’s creative right is not a 
right that is equivalent to the exclusive rights protected by § 106.
135
  Arguably, the rights 
in § 106, including the right to derivative works right under § 106(2), protect economic 
interests that are vastly different from the author’s creative interest, which protects the 
author’s personality and individuality.  Second, literary property protects the author’s 
personality represented in the work (such as stylistic preferences and artistic forms), as 
opposed to the expression in the work itself.  An author’s creative work is protectable 
subject matter under §§ 102 and 103.  But authorial expressions that take special form, 
such as a work that an author specifically creates to teach and educate children, will not 
be protected under these provisions if their ideas are used for a purpose that is completely 
in opposition to the intention of the author, such as to propagate violence among children.  
Allowing courts to make normative and prescriptive judgments that would introduce 
moral and ethical principles that protect authors in the copyright system would require 
one to assume that judges have an overriding duty to decide cases based on a set of 
sociopolitical norms that uphold principles of justice and fairness.  This is particularly 
true where legislation has not explicitly integrated these principles.  The author of this 
Article has argued elsewhere that the copyright system may be understood as a loosely 
formed political contract for social development, which provides identifiable norms that 
could guide judges confronted with a difficult copyright case.
136
  Hypothetically, a judge 
could decide, according to the moral and ethical convictions of society, that literary and 
artistic works can be used and produced for the purposes of promoting progress, and 
come to a decision that reflects these convictions and protects the author’s creative 
interest.  If the legal system has an underlying integrity that is built on unitive principles, 
which represents the legal system’s commitment to creating a “genuine [community] 
rather than a bare community,”
137
 it is possible that the courts could have a role in 
protecting the natural rights of authors while keeping in mind copyright’s institutional 
goal of promoting artistic progress. 
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III. COMMON LAW PROPERTY AND STATUTORY COPYRIGHT 
¶32  Would copyright law become redundant if the law were to protect literary property 
as a common law right of the author as suggested in this Article?  As discussed in Part II, 
the suggestion that the author’s literary property be protected as a natural right may invite 
criticism from copyright pessimists, who may consider the protection of literary property 
as an expansion of rights that would further limit the public’s ability to access creative 
works for use.  Additionally, many scholarly works have focused on the apparent conflict 
between the grant of a property right to encourage creative production and the need for 
access to creative works to feed the wheel of progress.
138
  Much of this literature sees the 
flaws of a system that needs reform,
139
 especially when the Internet and digital 
technologies have increased the user’s ability to interact with the work as a new and 
legitimate form of free expression.
140
  Copyright scholars and practitioners seem to 
continue to view the copyright system as inadequate in dealing with technological 
progress that brings advances, not only of science and useful arts, but also of society, 
culture, and the way political discourse is conducted.  When Benjamin Kaplan began his 
1966 James S. Carpentier Lecture at Columbia University School of Law, he stated that: 
As a veteran listener at many lectures by copyright specialists over the past 
decade, I know it is almost obligatory for a speaker to begin by invoking the 
“communications revolution” of our time, then to pronounce upon the 
inadequacies of the present copyright act, and finally to encourage all hands to 
cooperate in getting a Revision Bill passed.
141
 
This quote indicates that Professor Kaplan may have had an unquestioning resignation 
that the copyright system has failed to promote progress and is thus in dire need of 
reform. 
¶33  Literary property rights could, however, further the institutional goals of the 
copyright system rather than prevent progress, as some have feared.  A literary property 
right could bridge the gap between the interests of those involved (such as authors, 
publishers, and society) and the ultimate institutional interest of promoting progress in a 
legal system that lacks authentic creations that make positive contributions to the 
trajectory of social progress and cultural development.  The rights provided under the 
Copyright Act serve a particular purpose:  to encourage publication and distribution of 
creative works in a society in need of creative materials.  Without these statutory rights, 
the proper economic investments will not be made to convert an author’s expression into 
literary and artistic works that may then be distributed to society for use in education, 
 
138
 Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public 
Domain Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 8–10 (1993) (describing the growing body of legal 
commentators since 1981 who have become interested in how the expansion of intellectual property rights 
affect the public domain). 
139
 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 130; Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright from Formalities, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (1995); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in 
Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010). 
140
 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 69 
(2008) (describing a method of creation that uses the Internet and digital technologies, which “remixes” 
portions of works created across multiple media to produce a new work). 
141
 KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
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research, cultural programs, and study.  Indeed, very few authors are able to reach the 
masses without financial support from a publisher.  The statutory rights provided by the 
Copyright Act serve this important publishing and distributive function.  Literary 
property, on the other hand, would serve a completely different function.  It would 
encourage authors to create authentically and share their work with the public without 
fear that the work will be misused or abused once it is distributed into society.  It would 
also provide legal affirmation of the author’s expectation to be able to express himself.  
Both copyright and literary property encourage publication and distribution of creative 
works, as well as the creation of authentic expression, ultimately promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts. 
A. Copyright as an Economic Incentive to Publish 
¶34  Statutory rights under the copyright system facilitate investment in publishing and 
disseminating literary and artistic works by providing exclusive rights to the copyright 
owner.  Generally, because creative works are considered to be “public goods,” and 
therefore subject to free-riding, where a copier may produce subsequent copies of a work 
at marginal cost without paying its actual price,
142
 the law provides copyright owners 
with the exclusive right to reproduce, make derivatives, distribute, and publicly perform 
and display the work to exclude non-paying members of the public and encourage the 
initial investment in the work.  These exclusive rights protect the positive act of making 
literary and artistic works available to society to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts by allowing the copyright owner to recover fixed costs for the first production 
of a work and subsequent marginal costs of production when the original work is 
reproduced for reprinting, binding, distribution, and dissemination to the public.  Without 
copyright protection giving its owners exclusive rights, non-paying members of society 
will benefit from the investments made by the copyright owner and use the work without 
paying for it, thereby benefitting from what economists call a positive externality—a 
transaction spillover into society that provides a benefit but which is also not accounted 
for in the price of the good.
143
  Some scholars point out that free-riding on positive 
externalities, or spillovers, provides long-term benefits toward the legal system’s goal of 
progress to argue that they should not be internalized by the copyright owner.
144
  
However, this Article argues that these exclusive rights encourage the publication and 
dissemination of creative works by copyright owners who may otherwise invest their 
resources in other efforts. 
¶35  The protection of statutory rights under the current copyright system maximizes 
collective social welfare by ensuring scarce resources are allocated in the most 
economically efficient way.  This idea that granting exclusive rights in literary and 
artistic creations will result in more of their production is intuitive from an economic 
perspective—authors will not produce if their works may be easily appropriated by the 
public, especially when the product of their creativity is essentially non-excludable and 
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 and therefore, subject to use without payment.  Harold Demsetz’s famous 
1967 article, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” exemplifies the economic approach 
towards property-like entitlements in literary and artistic works.
146
  Demsetz argues that 
property rights facilitate the internalization of externalities, and often new property rights 
emerge when the benefits of internalizing externalities outweigh the costs of that 
internalization.  This usually occurs when new technology is developed and new markets 
open.
147
  To Professor Demsetz, a newly formed and growing market—the fur trade—
was the impetus that led to the establishment of well-defined private hunting territory 
among the Montagnes Indians,
148
 just as the emerging book market was the source of the 
establishment of exclusive copyright in literary works during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century in England.  Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 
published a year later, makes a related point:  unless some form of institutional 
governance sets aside common resources to be privately controlled, men, being 
economically rational creatures, are likely to take as much out of the commons as 
possible to maximize their gains and to put in as much waste as possible without having 
to bear the cost of cleaning the commons, without investing in building it up.
149
  As a 
result of each person acting their own self-interest, limited resources that are available to 
all will be depleted.
150
  As some lawyers see it, the purpose of the institution of private 
property is to protect the commons from complete depletion through overuse.
151
 
¶36  Both Professor Demsetz’s and Professor Hardin’s articles provide a neoclassical 
justification that supports the privatization of creative works and the expansion of 
property-like rights in information and knowledge.  The logic is difficult to deny:  if 
creative works are too easily appropriated, authors and publishers will not invest time or 
money to produce or disseminate creative works to the public when there are no 
guarantees of a return on investment.  Without exclusive rights in such works to prevent 
their free use by the public, creativity and innovation would likely decline.  By protecting 
the commercial value in the work through the exclusive rights under § 106, the law 
provides economic incentives to encourage creators of literary and artistic works to 
produce works and disseminate them to society.
152
  While termed a “property right” that 
protects commercial investments from spillovers into a market, statutory copyright is 
intended to serve a larger goal—a temporary monopoly is granted to the copyright owner, 
but these exclusive rights are to stimulate artistic creativity for society’s general good.  
 
145
 The exact “public good” nature of creative works has been explored elsewhere. See Christopher S. 
Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007).  
For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to say that creative works cannot be excluded and are non-rival 
as a broad economic principle. 
146
 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 
347 (1967). 
147
 Id. at 350.  
148
 Id. at 351. 
149




 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 559–60 (2001) 
(“[T]he conventional wisdom for many social scientists is that commons property generally leads to 
tragedy.  This claim—a truism of first-year law classes—is usually introduced as one of the strongest 
justifications for the institution of private property.”) (footnote omitted). 
152
 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129 (2004) (discussing the economic arguments for intellectual property). 
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Statutory rights do not preserve a “commons” from overuse as property rights are 
commonly thought to do.  Functionally, statutory rights make sure that creative works are 
generated and distributed to the public to increase the common repository of knowledge 
as soon as a work’s copyright expires.  The knowledge commons is enriched with the 
expiration of the property right—there is no real depletion of the commons, the tragedy 
that Professor Hardin feared.
153
  As such, statutory rights in literary and artistic creations, 
as state-granted incentives to encourage the creation of artistic works, might be better 
understood as a collection of disaggregated legal interests to use creative works in 
specific ways that will facilitate publication and dissemination to the public.  Therefore, 
statutory copyright, while considered as a property right, is not an ownership right in a 
work as an object for possessory control against the rest of the world—an in rem right as 
traditionally understood.
154
  Rather, it is an in personam right that defines a specific legal 
relationship between author, publisher, and user of a work as that relationship applies to 
the publication and distribution of a specific work.  Despite the general acceptance 
among property scholars that property relates to a bundle of rights that performs various 
state-prioritized functions and has nothing to do with property as a legally defined 
boundary drawn around a thing to effectively exclude the rest of the world from its use,
155
 
this same idea may not have influenced copyright jurisprudence as much—given the 
general thought of statutory copyright as a property right in a work.  On this point, the 
author of this Article has suggested elsewhere that property rights under the present 
copyright law would be more appropriately classified as “economic privileges.”
156
  These 
privileges should be recognized as in personam rights establishing specific contract-type 
relationships among parties responsible for producing, publishing, distributing, and using 
the work in the copyright system.  They should not be seen as creating absolute interests 
in the work as a privatized resource and should be treated differently from the author’s 
literary property rights, which are distinct rights in rem.
157
 
¶37  Because statutory copyright is designed to encourage investments in creative 
works, these rights might not encourage the creation of authentic works in the same way 
the recognition of literary property would.  The emphasis that neoclassical economics 
places on market rewards as the best mechanism to efficiently allocate resources for 
production, publication, and distribution of creative works has long-term consequences 
for the kind of literary and artistic works that are produced.  The neoclassicist’s 
assumption that economic incentives are positively correlated with creative production is 
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 See Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual 
Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2007). 
154
 Conventionally an in rem right meant a right “against a thing” in Latin. See Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 782 & n.28 (2001).  However, 
this term has been clarified by Wesley Hohfeld to mean “one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet 
separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing 
respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people.” WESLEY NEWCOMB 
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL 
ESSAYS 72 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (footnote omitted). 
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 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 
YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001) (“The conception of property as an infinitely variable collection of rights, 
powers, and duties has today become a kind of orthodoxy.”). 
156
 See Alina Ng, Rights, Privileges, and Access to Information, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 104 (2010). 
157
 Id. 





  Even accepting that assumption as true, there are still other, and 
perhaps more dire, effects of an overreliance on market incentives to generate authorial 
creativity and productivity. 
¶38  The first upshot of a market-centric approach to the copyright system is that it 
portrays the act of creativity and authorship—the expression of an author’s individual 
experience and personality—as a primarily economically driven activity.  It is possible 
that this may cause the public to treat works of authorship and other creative works as a 
commercial commodity, resulting in less respect for the process of creative authorship 
when these works are used.
159
  Second, the market-based approach may have blurred the 
important distinction between property and statutory rights and allowed copyright owners 
(such as publishers, distributors, and printers, who may have financially invested in the 
work but not been involved in its creation) to assert exclusive property-like rights in the 
expressive content of the work against the public.
160
  Property rights in an author’s 
creation define ownership rights in the work itself and involve a unique right in rem to 
exclude.  Only the creator of the work ought to be able to assert this right.  Third, the 
market-based approach establishes the commercial market as a new patron of authors and 
artists, compelling creators of literary and artistic works to produce works for the public.  
To ensure that they are remunerated for their works through the market, authors and 
artists may produce works that appeal to the general masses at the expense of producing 
works of authentic authorship.  As more authentic works of authorship are a result of an 
artist’s expressive individuality, they may be of greater authorial value to the progress of 
science and useful arts in society.
161
 
¶39  When considering the protection of literary property rights of authors, it is useful to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the copyright market in producing authentic forms of 
authorship that will contribute towards the advancement of knowledge or the progress of 
society.  Macaulay expressed immense faith in the copyright system when he commented 
that the system would free authors from the patronage of ministers and nobles by 
providing an alternative source of payment for their work.
162
  Macaulay believed that 
“men whose profession is literature, and whose private means are not ample” should be 
“remunerated for their literary labour” through the copyright system so that “valuable 
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 See Zimmerman, supra note 113. 
159
 Séverine Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 290 (2006).  In this article, Dusollier argues that “consumerism is as much a 
threat to copyright as the increasing commodification of copyright.” Id.  She goes on to state that “[t]urning 
copyrighted works into commodities has recast the public as individual consumers, and focusing on 
consumers makes explicit the recognition of a copyright regime that considers creative works solely as 
commodities to be exchanged in a market.” Id. 
160
 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 
1033 (1997).  Professor Lemley argues that the derivative right in paragraph (2) § 106 should remain an 
author’s right, and states that “it seems odd that a legal provision that ostensibly exists for the benefit of 
creators (artists or authors, for example) should confer rights instead on the owners of intellectual property 
rights.  As anyone who has ever published a book, a screenplay, or a song can attest, authorship and 
ownership are not necessarily the same thing.” Id. 
161
 The author of this Article has explored the idea of “authentic authorship” in a previous work.  
Although deeper analysis of the idea is warranted, see Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and 
Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 486–88 (2009) for a preliminary discussion. 
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 Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of February, 
1841, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 309, 310 (Robert P. Merges & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 
2004). 
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books” would be supplied to society.
163
  However, it is important to note that when the 
copyright market replaces the rich and noble as the author’s patron, a separate set of 
problems arise.  The author, instead of being bound to create works of literature and art 
for a human patron, is now bound to produce for a corporate or marketplace patron. 
¶40  Recording contracts between performing artists and recording companies are just 
one example of the constraints that the marketplace and corporate patronage impose on 
creativity today.
164
  But the effects of market-based constraints on authorial creativity 
were felt as far back as the eighteenth century, when a market for literature emerged in 
Germany.  German playwright and philosopher Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller 
broke off from the patronage of the Duke of Württemberg when the possibility of selling 
his works on the market presented itself.
165
  Schiller referred to the reading public as his 
“school, [his] sovereign, [and his] trusted friend” and began his career as a professional 
writer by “appealing to no other throne than the human spirit.”
166
  The literary market, 
however, turned out to be indifferent and unrewarding to Schiller’s more authentic and 
intellectually demanding philosophical works on ethics, aesthetics, and reason.  The fame 
and economic rewards Schiller yearned for from the public were, to a certain extent, only 
acquired by creating works that the public demanded at that time, such as historical 
narratives rather than the philosophical works that were Schiller’s forte.
167
  Schiller never 
found the reward he expected from the literary market, and in 1792, he accepted the 
patronage of the Danish Duke of Augustenburg, who gave him the intellectual freedom 
necessary to produce more authentic forms of authorship.  Schiller, reflecting on his 
experience with the literary marketplace, noted that the demands of the market for works 
that appealed to a wide segment of the paying public was, in reality, irreconcilable with 
the demands of authentic expression.
168
 
¶41  Unfortunately, contemporary copyright markets could be just as unreceptive to 
literary and artistic works that do not conform to the expectations of popular culture or 
carry widespread appeal because authors and creators who seek to make a living by 
selling their works to the public may have to exchange personal authorial or artistic 
integrity for contemporary and more popular creations.  When the copyright system treats 
creative works as marketable commodities instead of personal expressions of creativity, it 
may leave individual creators with little choice but to compromise their own artistic 
authenticity and integrity.  To a large extent, courts’ reluctance to make artistic 
judgments about creative works in deciding eligibility for copyright protection mitigates 
some of the harshness of the marketplace for authentic creations.
169
  Some authors may 
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  However, where an author does not make that deliberate 
decision, the copyright market will mold creative expression to satisfy the demands of 
popular public tastes, which could prevent the production of more authentic works that 
may have greater influence on how science and useful arts advance. 
¶42  The final point to make about copyright as an incentive to produce and secure 
rewards from the market, is that it protects the owner and not just the author of the work.  
Even though the Copyright Act recognizes the author as the first owner of a copyright,
171
 
the exclusive rights that are protected under § 106 are fully transferrable
172
 and may be 
owned by an owner of copyright through an assignment of rights from the author.
173
  This 
has resulted in a concentration of ownership rights in the intermediaries who disseminate 
works of the author to his readers, but whose primary interest in the work may be purely 
commercial in nature and misaligned from the institutional goals of the copyright 
system.
174
  Unlike authors, who create works as a form of personal expression, and users, 
who consume works for enjoyment, inspiration, learning, research, and so on, a publisher 
does not have an interest in the work as an expression of creativity.  Rather, a publisher is 
interested in the work itself as a marketable commodity that may provide profits.  The 
commoditization of creative works to capture social benefits or positive externalities 
from the production of creative works is a natural consequence of statutory copyright.  
Although the exclusive rights under § 106 are intended to facilitate dissemination of 
creative expressions of individual creators through the market to ultimately benefit the 
public and advance science and useful arts, these rights have a tendency to secure the a 
monopoly position of the intermediary publisher for the publication and distribution of 
works.
175
  Without competition for the publication and distribution of works in the 
market, it becomes increasingly difficult to “clear rights” before using a copyrighted 
work, causing a “chilling effect” on creativity and innovation that depends on the use of 
creative works from earlier generations.
176
  Protecting economic interests in the 
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 For clear chilling effect of a still tentative copyright on public use of the work, see Robert Spoo, 
Note, Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: The Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 
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distribution and sale of artistic works could be a hindrance, rather than an impetus, to 
public access to creative works in all forms—artwork, music, literature, software 
programs, visual works, and research materials—if one is not clear that the statutory 
protections for copyright owners serve as an incentive to make works available to the 
public in furtherance of a prioritized goal and should be exercised with that goal in mind.  
Perhaps relabeling the exclusive rights as statutory privileges that entitle the copyright 
owner to sell and distribute the work exclusively for the purposes of furthering an 
institutionally identified priority (in other words, progress) may prevent the exercise of 
§ 106 rights that would take away from copyright’s goals.  The key to keeping on track 
with the goal of progress is a deeper understanding of the different facets of a property 
right and how the exercise of § 106 rights are limited by this understanding. 
B. The Different Facets of a Property Right 
¶43  Many property scholars believe, on some fundamental level, that property rights are 
about establishing boundaries around resources through exclusive control of that resource 
by the property owner.  William Blackstone is often quoted as providing the 
quintessential definition of what a property right should look like—it is a “sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
177
  Some 
scholars argue that this right to exclude is the defining characteristic of a property right—
its sine qua non.
178
  Indeed, without a right to exclude others from trespass, theft, and use 
of the property, the notion of property would be meaningless.  The right to exclude 
provides normative meaning to the concept of ownership in a society.
179
  The idea of 
property as a right to exclude is also an integral part of copyright jurisprudence.
180
  
However, scholars have also come to understand property as a legal term that defines 
different legal relationships among members of society in relation to a particular 
resource.  Property is not, per se, a right in the resource itself.
181
  Given that property law 
defines the relationship between the owner of a resource against the rest of the world, 
some scholars hypothesize that the strength of property rights varies on a continuous 
scale and that the state utilizes them strategically depending on the size of the resource, 
the range of activities that the owner of a resource is allowed, the cost of monitoring and 
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 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. 
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enforcing those rights, and the fluctuating value of the resource.
182
  Property rights—
exclusionary on one extreme and organizational or governmental on the other
183
—
provide signals or information to society as to how a particular resource is to be used.  As 
property rights are used by the government to define the relationship between the 
property owner and the resource more clearly, society’s conduct toward the resource will 
be more effectively managed.
184
 
¶44  Statutory rights under § 106, even though they are “exclusive,” should not be 
exercised in an exclusionary way in light of what property scholars think is the 
functionality of property.  In the copyright system, some scholars see creative production 
as a privatized activity that should be subject to public values
185
 and the advancement in 
science and arts as depending on the public’s ability to access and use knowledge and 
information easily.  Therefore, to these scholars, the application of the statutory rights 
cannot feasibly be seen as exclusionary in the sense that the public should be denied 
access to the work unless the copyright owner grants the public permission to access the 
work.  Professors Hardin and Demsetz’s concern that resources in the commons will be 
depleted through overexploitation does not apply to creative works.  As exclusionary 
rights are often used to deal with the problem of over exploitation, there is no necessity 
for its use to prevent public access to creative resources because, unlike natural resources 
that are susceptible to depletion through overuse, creative resources are not scarce and 
will not deplete through overexploitation.
186
  In fact, new generations of authors and 
creators need to be able to use collective knowledge, research findings, and documented 
experiences to guide their own explorations and experiments in creating new materials 
for society.  The exercise of the rights under § 106, if exclusionary in practice, will make 
the development of culture, accessible education, or economic growth difficult, if not 
impossible.  Hence, on the spectrum of property functionality Professor Smith developed, 
statutory copyright would not lie on the exclusionary rule pole, but at the organizational 
or governance pole, where each specific entitlement that accrues to the copyright owner 
is carefully articulated.  As Professor Smith points out, this contradicts a more 
exclusionary function of a patent right that denies access to a patent for those who do not 
have permission to use the patent.
187
 
¶45  If one thinks of copyright as functioning on a different scale than patent (the other 
form of intellectual property designed to advance the progress of science and useful arts), 
it may become clear that statutory copyright is not about denying public access for the 
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purposes of establishing the creative work’s value.
188
  The value of a copyrighted work is 
often clear—it is the value a reader would be willing to pay for the use of an author’s 
expression, which the market readily sets.
189
  Where the market fails, copyright law has 
the built-in mechanism of fair use to correct the failure.
190
  The structure of copyright 
law, with clearly enumerated rights under § 106, lends itself to specific rules of 
governance that manage societal use of creative works.  Thus, statutory copyright, in a 
property sense does not establish perimeters or a fence around a limited resource, but 
rather creates a bridged connection between authors and their readers to serve a very 
specific institutional goal.  It is not intended to grant exclusionary rights, nor is it 
intended to create an open access public right to literary and artistic works.  Rather, it is 
intended to provide heavy regulation of how works are published, disseminated, and 
used. 
¶46  Recognizing that statutory rights in literary and artistic works serve to govern and 
regulate various uses and interests, both economic and noneconomic (including 
recreational, research-related, and educational uses), in creative works will clarify how 
one should think about the literary property rights of the author.  Statutory rights affirm a 
basic economic principle underlying the copyright system:  by granting a bundle of 
entitlements to creative works to copyright owners exclusively under § 106, investments 
in the publication and dissemination of creative works to the public will be made.  
Producers of creative works will be more willing to invest in publication and distribution 
if they have exclusive rights to use the work.  In a classical Coasean fashion, the 
Copyright Act allows the market to ultimately decide who may use a particular work, 
how that work may be used, and when it may be used by providing the exclusivity 
needed for contractual bargains to occur among authors, publishers, and users so that 
rights to use the work may be efficiently allocated.
191
  To a large extent, scholars 
influenced by Coase have abandoned the idea of property as a right against the rest of the 
world and embraced property as a state device to allocate use rights.  The concept of 
property as “a bundle of rights,” institutionalized by new institutional economics, 
embraces the idea that contractual relationships—and not a general right to exclude—lie 
at the heart of property law.
192
  The focus on contractual relations between the owner of a 
right and identifiable parties to that contract changes the understanding of property from 
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a right in a resource against the rest of the world into an abstract collection of aggregated 
rights that do not represent real ownership rights in things.  In this light, statutory 
copyright, embodying various use rights under § 106, does not relate as much to a right in 
the work against an infinite and unidentifiable group of people, but to a right to the 
exclusive use of the work that is enforceable against a single person or a small number of 
identifiable persons who use the work without paying the contract price.  It facilitates the 
transfer of creative works to individuals in society who put the work to its most valuable 
use and resolves disputes among authors, publishers, and consumers of creative works.  
But it does not protect the author’s creative personality, as expressed in the work, from 
abuse when the work is distributed to an infinite and unidentifiable group of people, as a 
property right would. 
C. Conceptual Differences Between Property and Copyright 
¶47  The conventional view is that the owner of property has certain rights to those 
resources which he owns.  For example, property owners have a right in rem, a right or an 
interest in the property or thing, which is good against the rest of the world.
193
  In rem 
rights create an entitlement to control access to, or use of, a resource that may be 
enforceable against an unlimited and indefinite group of people, who individually owe a 
duty to refrain from accessing or using that resource.  Commentators on the law 
distinguish an in rem right from an in personam right.  In personam rights represent 
personal interests that an individual possesses by virtue of a personal or contractual 
relationship with the person who owes the corresponding duty.  In personam rights are 
personal to the right-holder and they neither pertain to, nor convey, property ownership in 
a thing.
194
  An owner of real property, for example, has rights in rem in the land he owns 
and is entitled to enforce a right to exclude all others from trespassing on his land.  The 
rest of the world owes a specific duty to respect this right of the property owner to 
exclude others from encroaching upon the land.  The right the property owner exercises 
stems from ownership of the land and is attached to the land.  Contrast this with a lien on 
land as a security to recover payment of a debt.  The right to repayment of a debt is an in 
personam right against the debtor even though a security interest given as collateral for 
the debt may create an interest in rem to secure payment of the debt.
195
  The lien holder’s 
right is therefore a personal right, or a right in personam, traceable to the creditor-debtor 
relationship between lien holder and property owner. 
¶48  This distinction between in rem and in personam rights offers insight into the 
conceptual differences between literary property and copyright.  The author’s natural 
right in his expression establishes an entitlement to creative works that excludes everyone 
in society—an indefinite class of individuals—from using the work in a way that would 
damage an author’s creative personality or mar its quality and purpose.  Protecting an 
author’s creative interest by creating a literary property right in his expression contained 
in his work creates an in rem right, which means the right is enforceable against the rest 
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of the world.  The right would lie on the exclusionary pole of property entitlement that 
Professor Smith spoke about.
196
  Indeed, it makes sense to protect the author’s creative 
interest and personality through an exclusionary rule.  The author’s expression cannot be 
easily valued—while creative works may have a market value in the price that a 
consumer would willingly pay, how can anyone put a market price on the expressive 
qualities of individuals such as Monet, Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or in more 




 or the late Samuel 
Beckett?
199
  It would seem more probable that an exclusionary right would protect 
creative interests better by requiring that the rest of the world respect the expressive 
qualities of the person who created the work.  In this sense, the creator’s interest would 
be protected by a property rule that, if infringed, should be remedied through the grant of 
an injunction.
200
  The economic rights that the law grants authors and copyright owners, 
including the right to exclusively reproduce, distribute, make derivatives, publicly 
perform and display, and digitally transmit the work, are personal rights to use the work 
that stem from ownership of copyright—not the work—that allows for the recovery of 
profits from sale and distribution of the work.  These rights create entitlements to sell and 
distribute the work exclusively and create an in personam right against a specific 
individual or entity that infringes this personal right.   
¶49  Statutory rights only entail a personal right to recover payment for the use of the 
work and not an absolute right to exclude the whole of society from using the work.  As 
such, when statutory rights are infringed, the proper remedy should be damages that are 
consistent with the protection of an entitlement through a liability, and not a property 
rule.
201
  This makes equal sense too—rights to sell and distribute works are more easily 
valued through the market by how much the public is willing to pay for the work.  
Movies, CDs, individual music downloads through iTunes, books, subscription services, 
and other forms of creative works on the market have a somewhat fixed and marginally 
variable price.  As such, it would be more reasonable to tailor specific governance-type 
rules for economic rights on the other end of Professor Smith’s property scale to facilitate 
easy transfer and bundling of rights in literary and artistic works for public use. 
¶50  These two distinct rights in literary and artistic works—in rem and in personam 
rights—ensure that creators are granted the autonomy to authentically express and at the 
same time effectively disseminate these works to the public through the market.  In rem 
rights encourage creativity and expression without the constraints that might otherwise 
exist if creators fear abuse of their creativity by the public when the work is distributed.  
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In personam rights encourage wide dissemination of these works to the public.  The 
sovereign right of the creator as property owner of a work allows the creator to deny 
access to the work based on an absolute right to exclude when he assesses a use to 
undermine his creative personality.  When the creator of a creative work considers a use 
to undermine his rights in such a fashion, he may enforce his exclusionary right against 
the infringer.  This right is good against the world and applies to an infinite number of 
individuals who owe a corresponding duty to refrain from infringing the creative rights of 
the author.  An economic right, however, does not include the right to exclude as a 
property right does, but rather originates from a contractual relationship between the 
author and society to make the work available or accessible for market value.
202
  As this 
distinction between property (in an in rem sense) and copyright (in an in personam sense) 
does not appear as doctrine in copyright law—at least not since Donaldson v. Beckett and 
Wheaton v. Peters
203
 dismissed the notion of literary property—there is little normative 
guidance to provide answers to the question of how authors, copyright owners, and 
consumers of literary and artistic works should treat entitlements to literary and artistic 
works. 
¶51  Statutory rights that create specific rights for copyright owners to use creative 
works have been labeled property rights, giving rise to the assumption that such rights are 
in rem rights, which allow the copyright owner to generally exclude society from using 
their work.  This has a significant impact on the copyright system because it denies 
access to legitimate public use rights, such as the right to print, distribute, or share 
derivative works to communicate ideas, develop culture, and educate.  The congressional 
grant of a right to print implicitly assumes that society will be able to use the work as 
long as the use does not unreasonably interfere with the copyright owner’s right to 
receive payment for the production and dissemination of the work to society.  It provides 
the institutional support that law and economics scholars from the new institutional 
school believe is needed for copyright owners to enter into contracts for the sale and 
public distribution of what is essentially a resource that is non-rivalrous and non-
excludable.  There is a need for the law to be clear about the conceptual differences 
between property that protects the individual creator’s right to personhood, autonomy, 
and expressive identity and copyright that facilitates a political goal—the progress of 
science and useful arts—if it is to ultimately fulfill its institutional goal and direct society 
towards advancement.  The law needs to separate the two, and it is likely that the 
copyright debate will change its shape.  But there will be challenges that the law will face 
and this is discussed in Part IV below. 
IV. SHAPING THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 
¶52  Conventional understanding of the copyright debate sees private property pitted 
against the public domain, as copyright owners and public users struggle for control and 
access to creative works.  While the public domain symbolizes the public sphere central 
 
202
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to a thriving civil society, wherein cultural artifacts can be freely exchanged without the 
shackles that follow private patronage or state subsidies, it has been accepted as an innate 
product that emerges from the term limitation of copyright and very little was written 
specifically about it.  In the last two decades or so, the public domain has been portrayed 
as necessary to enable society to produce new forms of authorship and other forms of 
works essential to the progress of science, rather than as a residual space to hold works 
that are not subject to copyright.
204
  Today, the protection of the public domain from the 
intrusion of property rights has become an affirmative discourse that is the defining ethos 
for the public side of the copyright debate.
205
  More effort is taken today to increase the 
visibility of the public domain as a space susceptible to the tragedy of the anticommons
206
 
than ever before. 
¶53  Professor Boyle’s use of environmentalism—a broad social movement to conserve, 
restore, and improve the health of the environment—as a metaphor for the politics that 
should shape the direction of intellectual property policy
207
 is a fine example of the effort 
intellectual property minimalists take to defend public rights against private property.  
However, the interests that arise with the production, dissemination, and use of creative 
works are not just between copyright owners and the general public.  A proper discourse 
about rights to creative works should include an analysis of corresponding duties and 
obligations that arise from the protection of such rights as well as through the proper 
relationship among authors, publishers, and consumers of the work.  The relationships 
between these parties and their rights and duties are not clear under copyright law, an 
institution clearly intended to achieve a positive agenda—the progress of science and 
useful arts.  If the copyright debate is reshaped into a tripartite discourse among creators, 
publishers, and consumers of creative works by explicitly recognizing authorial rights as 
literary property distinct from economic rights, the private property–public interest 
gridlock that has stalled real legal progress could be removed. 
A. Judicial Challenges and Wheaton v. Peters 
¶54  The biggest challenge to moving in the direction proposed in this Article is the 
judiciary’s general adherence to precedent.  Supreme Court cases following Wheaton v. 
Peters have interpreted the decision in Wheaton as determining that all rights to creative 
works are statutorily created to be well-settled law.
208
  Proposing that the author’s literary 
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right be recognized at common law would require a review and overrule of Wheaton v. 
Peters if today’s Supreme Court decides that the case may have been incorrectly decided 
or if its application should be limited to the specific circumstances surrounding the 
dispute between Henry Wheaton and Richard Peters.  Because only the Supreme Court 
can overrule one of its own decisions, state courts and lower federal courts are not at 
liberty to depart from Wheaton’s ruling, even if convinced that the author should have 
creative rights at common law.
209
 
¶55  If the Court is persuaded that authors should have natural rights in their works 
separate from copyright, and that natural law could be a valid source of moral and legal 
rights for authors, the Supreme Court might reconsider Wheaton—specifically, the 
institutional make-up of the actors within the copyright system (authors, publishers, and 
consumers).  Overruling a long-standing case that has provided the foundational basis for 
the current copyright system would be difficult, if not impossible.  Justice Breyer, for 
example, desires stability in the law over change, uncertainty, and discontinuity.  Cases 
that have become “well embedded in national culture,” such as Miranda v. Arizona, 
which the general public has come to associate with the affirmation of the arrestee’s 
constitutional rights to remain silent and to legal representation, would be extremely 
difficult to overrule, even if the Court considers them wrongly decided.
210
  The same goes 
for cases that have set standards for public conduct, which then invite investments of 
“time, effort and money based on [a] decision,” because judicial practices that ignore 
these types of public reliance would also “threaten[] economic prosperity,” as people 
become more reluctant to make investments based on laws that might change easily.
211
  
Hence, the decision to overrule a case is only made where there are exceptional 
circumstances, or “special justification,” in the Court’s words.
212
  Previous cases have 
been overruled by the Court when their “conceptual underpinnings” have been “removed 
or weakened” by developments in statute or judicial doctrine and when their decisions 
become “irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.”
213
  Other 
justifications for overruling a previous Court decision include where there is incoherence 
or inconsistency in the law caused by “inherent confusion created by an unworkable 
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decision,” where “the decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important 
objectives embodied in other laws,” and where they are considered “outdated” and 
“inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare.”
214
  Wheaton v. Peters is 
deeply embedded in the copyright system and overruling this decision would affect many 
commercial and personal arrangements that are organized around its decision that statute 
is the only source of legal rights to creative works.  Modern discourse on the nature of 
rights in creative works appears to have strengthened the conceptual underpinnings of the 
Wheaton decision and does not seem to justify a judicial inquiry into the merits of 
overruling the decision.  State courts would also be preempted from developing state 
jurisprudence on the author’s rights even if the Court overruled the case.
215
  However, the 
Court may still explicitly recognize the author’s literary property and overrule Wheaton v. 
Peters if it is convinced that the decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of the 
institutional goals of the copyright system. 
B. Potential Legislative Responses 
¶56  Congress may also be an appropriate branch of government to protect the author’s 
literary property.  Assuming that the legislative problems that Professor Litman identified 
can be overcome, such as by having broader representation of author interests during the 
deliberative process before copyright laws are passed, the proposed changes advocated in 
this Article may be introduced into the copyright system as policies become new laws.  
While courts, especially the Supreme Court, may shape copyright jurisprudence through 
the development of case law, Congress may create a more congenial environment for 
groups of authors, publishers, and consumers of creative works that facilitates 
cooperation towards the larger institutional goal of progress.  Bills that have been 
introduced recently have favored the rights of copyright owners over authors of creative 
works, including creators of software that supports web-based platforms on the Internet 
and consumers of creative works.
216
  A step in the direction proposed in this Article 
includes the recognition that parties in the copyright system—authors, publishers, and 
users—have significantly different, but equally legitimate, interests in creative works.  A 
possible starting point for the legislation to protecting literary property is to clarify that 
copyright owners are just one party in a tripartite group of entities with certain rights and 
duties that should be oriented toward copyright’s institutional goal.  A clear articulation 
of the author’s literary property and the entitlements and obligations that the recognition 
of the right would create ought to send a signal to society that copyright laws passed by 
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¶57  As a general rule, any legislation passed by Congress to give effect to the proposal 
in this Article should have prospective effect to comply with the rule of law.
217
  As 
Professor Joseph Raz has argued, laws should only apply to conduct that occurs after the 
law has gone into effect, so that it can provide guidance.
218
  In this light, any legislation 
passed by Congress today to give effect to a separate literary right that belongs only to 
authors or other creators of creative works should only affect future conduct and not have 
retroactive effect.  However, recent copyright legislation, such as the Copyright Term 
Extension Act,
219
 extends copyright protection to literary and artistic works by another 
twenty years, has been applied retroactively to works created before the act in which 
there is copyright protection.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court observed that 
throughout history, Congress has made it a practice to grant authors and other creators of 
creative works with existing copyrights “the benefit of term extensions so that all under 
copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”
220
 
¶58  As the Court pointed out, the first Congress provided protection to existing and 
future works alike through the first federal copyright statute, the 1790 Copyright Act, and 
that since then, “Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing and 
future copyrights.”
221
  The Court relied on McClurg v. Kingsland, which applied the 
Patent Act of 1839 retroactively to a patent secured in 1835 on the basis that Congress’s 
power to legislate on patents is absolute under the Constitution and that legislation can be 
modified to “not take away the rights of property in existing patents.”
222
  It further 
decided that the fact “that the enlarged term covers existing copyrights” was not “a sound 
objection to the validity of a copyright term extension, enacted pursuant to the same 
constitutional grant of authority.”
223
  Conceivably, laws protecting the author’s literary 
property—or the creator’s creative property more generally—that Congress passes today 
may apply retroactively to copyrighted works already in existence and protected under 
the present regime so that the protection of all rights in literary and artistic works will be 
governed under the same statutory regime. 
C. The Institutional Goal to Advance Science and Useful Arts 
¶59  In the final analysis, literary property and copyright should entitle and obligate 
authors, publishers, and society to promote progress through the use and production of 
creative works.  In Copyright Law and the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, the 
author of this Article argued that the most important component in a legal institution 
charged with advancing society and culture through such use of creative works is the 
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connection between the author and his reader and, on a much larger and broader scale, 
the creator of creative works and his public audience.
224
  By acknowledging and, where 
possible, protecting literary property rights of the author, the law will encourage more 
direct and authentic contribution towards progress as authors become more encouraged to 
express themselves freely in ways that will have a greater impact on social and cultural 
advancement.  Explicit recognizing that authors are directly connected with their work on 
a personal and visceral level would not only protect the author’s creative interest, but 
would increase authors’ awareness of their moral and ethical obligations toward readers 
of their work and society at large. 
¶60  Explicitly recognizing literary property would also create moral and ethical duties 
for society to recognize authors for their contributions by attributing their work to them 
and to refrain from using works in ways that detract from the author’s intended 
contribution to the literary arts.  Thus the copyright system must separate the role of the 
publisher from the author so that it becomes clear that while publishers are entitled to 
economic rewards for publishing and distributing works to society, their rights as 
copyright owners under the copyright statute are significantly different from the property 
rights of authors and other creators because of the lack of a personal relationship with the 
work. 
¶61  A healthy thriving society should resolve issues of public morality, which is greatly 
needed in the copyright system today as a collective whole.  This call for increased public 
participation in the resolution of constitutional issues, such as the progress of science and 
useful arts, is not new.  Scholars have counseled against alienating moral discussion of 
“how active and responsible citizens should constitute themselves” to courts and the 
judicial process.”
225
  Moral discussions should be society’s responsibility.  There may be 
a need, therefore, for individual authors and users to articulate how copyright rules and 
practices enrich or deprive an individual author’s or user’s sense of self to put citizen 
participation on issues of public morality back in the public’s hands and to invigorate 
citizen participation in moral discourses within the copyright system.
226
  Such 
participation in moral discourse about copyright’s institutional aims may already be 
taking place, as with the discourses that surround open content and open software and 
copyright licenses. 
¶62  Online petitions opposing the Stop Online Piracy Act, the Protect IP Act and the 
Online Protection and Digital Enforcement Act have already generated an official White 
House response laying out what President Obama’s administration will and will not 
support.
227
  This is an important step in encouraging public discourse on issues of 
morality and ethics that will have profound effects on copyright’s institutional goal, but 
there is more to think about.  For example, there is also a need to be aware of the 
differences between two distinguishable bases for recognizing property rights in creative 
works.  Conventional understanding of property rights in the Lockean just-dessert theory 
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and the Hegelian personality theory protect resources because they are appropriated—or 
taken—from their surroundings.  But the premise for protecting literary property is not 
that resources are appropriated to one’s person; rather, it is based on the author’s giving 
of her creative self to her surroundings.  The essential premise for protecting literary 
property is that an author makes a personal and authentic contribution to social and 
cultural progress by giving her creative self to her surroundings.  Because the author’s 
role is to give rather than take resources from society, the author should be protected to 
the extent that his giving is violated or abused by society.  Otherwise, the act of creation 
should not be consistent with private control over creative resources.  The law should 
refrain from enforcing these controls unless society’s use of the work affects the author’s 
individuality or creative personality in ways that will prevent the creation of authentic 
works of authorship.  It is important for the community to continuously reengage in 
discussions to take control of public morality discourses about the copyright system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶63  By conceptualizing the copyright system as comprising of three distinct parties—
authors, publishers, and the public—each with separate interests in literary and artistic 
works, it becomes evident that authors and publishers fulfill very different roles in the 
copyright system.  Essentially, authors create works that can advance science and the arts, 
while publishers provide a channel for delivering authors’ expressions to their readers.  
Although some authors may create their work for profit, many authors create works 
solely or largely for noneconomic reasons, such as building their reputations, contributing 
to knowledge and learning, or communicating ideas or telling stories.  Publishers, on the 
other hand, are typically profit-motivated and invest in the publication and dissemination 
of creative works to recover financial gains from the market.
228
  Thus, it is surprising that, 
given the distinct and sometimes conflicting interests of authors and publishers, modern 
copyright law treats the interests and expectations of both in the same way.
229
  But 
because copyright law is statutory and is augmented by a prolific body of case law, jurists 
and scholars of copyright law have given very little attention to the separate roles authors 
and publishers play in society, their different expectations from the creation and 
distribution of works, and the effect their different roles and expectations have on 
copyright’s institutional goal of promoting progress in science and useful arts.  Courts 
typically defer to Congress where intellectual property laws are concerned, and often 
yield to policy decisions evident in legislation.  As a result, courts have not attempted to 
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¶64  This Article proposes that literary property and copyright are distinguishable and 
separable legal concepts and that separating these rights and developing laws to protect 
authors’ interests in their creations is necessary if the copyright system is to ultimately 
fulfill its institutional goal of promoting the progress of science and arts.  The author 
plays a specific role in the copyright system that cannot be fulfilled by other parties in 
that system—to contribute creative works that readers may use for society’s benefit.  To 
the extent that such works embody their author’s creative personality and authentic 
expression, the copyright system should explicitly recognize literary property of authors 
as a natural right.  The law has been very clear that all rights to literary and artistic works 
emanate solely from copyright law.  As a result, there is little room for the common law 
to develop a coherent body of rules that would protect an author’s expectations and rights 
separately from those of the publisher.  But this should not preclude the explicit 
recognition of literary property by the judicial system, the legislature, and the public.  
Justice McLean’s statement in Wheaton v. Peters, that any assertion of rights in creative 
works must be sustained under acts of Congress,
231
 should not be taken as a closed and 
concluded matter if one is committed to the pursuit of progress.  Following Wheaton v. 
Peters’s reasoning has facilitated the development of rich, statutory-based copyright 
jurisprudence in the United States.  However, the existence of common law literary rights 
that an author should have in his work should be evaluated to protect the expressive 
freedom necessary for authors to produce authentic works. 
¶65  A creator’s interest in her creation is often two-fold.  There is the economic interest 
in selling the work and making a profit from its sales.  But there is also a non-economic 
interest in protecting the personality of the creator and integrity of the work once it is 
disseminated into society.  This Article has argued that, to protect noneconomic interests 
of the author as the creator of a work, it is necessary to reevaluate the question of literary 
property and authors’ natural rights to that which they create.  Reasons to reject the 
notion of literary property do not seem sustainable if one carefully considers what 
explicitly recognizing literary property would achieve, the fundamental differences 
between literary property and statutory copyright, and literary property’s role in 
facilitating the progress of science and useful arts.  The arguments presented here should 
apply to the broader community of creative producers.  Although this Article is written 
from the author’s perspective and from the vantage point of literary property rights, its 
reasoning and argument are nevertheless applicable to all creative fields.
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